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INTRODUCTION

Sentencing convicted criminals is a solemn undertaking by
which courts pass judgment based upon all sorts of background
information. Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) prescribe an array of factors which judges must employ in imposing
sentences. Under federal law, the court is primarily informed of
relevant factors by a presentence investigation report (PSR) prepared by a probation officer. The report is disclosed to the defendant, who is given the opportunity to rebut incorrect information in
the PSR. The trial judge must then resolve those disputes by making findings of fact and submitting a written record of them to accompany the report for both appellate and incarceration purposes.
Although defendants who stand before the court prepared to
plead guilty are told that, if they do so, there will not be "a trial of
any kind," there usually is a trial of sorts addressing factual disputes
at the sentencing phase. Indeed, the sentencing hearing has become as much a trial as the guilt phase because it invariably resolves new facts crucial to the sentence. Adjudication of facts at
sentencing hearings under the Guidelines loosely resembles an abbreviated version of civil pretrial and trial practice. However, the
PSR usually contains proof in the form of hearsay, unconstrained
by rules of evidence. Consequently, the sentencing "trial" is often a
summary one. It is a most informal set of fact-finding procedures,
unlike those governing any other federal tribunals.
This Article compares adjudication of disputed facts at sentencing with that of civil and other criminal issues. In particular,
the Article focuses on the probation officer's PSR as a multiplepurpose document created by the officer to fulfil three different
roles: (1) prosecutor; (2) investigator and witness; and (3) adjudicative officer. Although much has been written on probation officers' diverse duties in preparing the PSR 1 and on the
1 See generally Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Strange PhilosophicalBedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933 (1995) (an excellent article chronicling the transformation of the mission of the federal probation scheme
under the Guidelines and examining the suitability of probation officers for their new
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Constitutional2 and evidentiary- aspects of Guidelines sentencing,
this Article will focus on the several distinct uses of the PSR in the
sentencing process. Its integral involvement in the development of
the sentencing record-charging, proving, and resolving sentencing issues-has no analogue in federal law.
II.

A.

SENTENCING PROCEDURES

ConstitutionalProcedure

Sentencing has traditionally been accorded a special place in
criminal procedure. The stakes for a criminal defendant include
prison terms, fines, forfeiture of property, and restitution obligation.4 Yet, unlike pretrial and trial procedures in the guilt phase of
trial, virtually no sentencing procedures are mandated by the Constitution. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends only to proceedings which are "critical stages" of the case. 5
role); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1519-33 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, C.J.,
dissenting).
2 See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28
AM. CRiM. L. REv. 161, 208-10 (1991) (federal judge's article arguing that application
of the Guidelines violates the Due Process Clause); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That
Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-FindingUnder the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 323-25 (1992) (arguing that due process
mandates higher burdens of proof and more procedural protections for resolution of
factual disputes); see generally Edward R. Becker, InsuringReliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses be Applied?, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1993) (federal circuit judge's argument that Due Process
Clause requires courts to afford defendant benefit of more procedural rights before
and during sentencing hearing and a heightened standard of reliability for considering hearsay). See also generally DanielJ. Capra, Sentencing Guidelines and the Fifth Amendment, 205 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Jan. 3, 1991).
3 Randolph N. Jonakait, InsuringReliable FactFinding in Guidelines Sentencing: Why
Not Real Evidence Rules?, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 31, 39-41 (1993) (questioning distinction
between guilt and trial phase as unprincipled); Deborah Young, Untested Evidence: A
Weak Foundationfor Sentencing, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 63, 65-66 (1993) (noting that use of
Federal Rules of Evidence at sentencing would greatly enhance the reliability of factual findings).
4 The sanctions attending most criminal convictions include incarceration, fines,
and restitution. Federal law authorizes levying a $250,000 fine against an individual
convicted of most felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (3) (1992). Many drug felonies trigger much heavier fines. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1992) (providing that
illegal possession of one kilogram of heroin carries fine of $4 million). Generally, a
court may also award restitution to the victims of the defendants' crime. See 18 U.S.C.
§8 3663-64 (1992). Restitution awards are enforceable by execution in the same manner as a civil judgment. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h)(2) (1992). Under the Guidelines, the
court "shall" impose a fine in all cases, except "where the defendant establishes that
he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine." U.S.S.G.
§ 5E.1.2(a).
5 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (post-indictment line-up of suspects
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Although the sentencing itself is such a stage of the prosecution, 6
the defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment right to have
counsel present at his presentence interview with the federal probation officer.7 In most cases, there is no Fifth Amendment right
against compelled testimony at sentencing. Rather, upon a plea or
verdict of guilty, the defendant must submit to an interview with
the probation officer.8 Moreover, because the sentencing hearing
is distinct from trial on the issue of guilt, federal courts have held
that most other provisions of the Bill of Rights generally do not
apply. For example, there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial at sentencing, even in a capital case. 9 Similarly, while the Due
Process Clause requires that elements of the offense must be
proven by proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction,' the preponderance standard of proof has been found sufficient for facts germane to sentencing.1"
including defendant is "critical stage of the prosecution" requiring presence of counsel under Sixth Amendment).
6 United States v. Souder, 782 F.2d 1534, 1538 (lth Cir. 1986). In Souder, the
government conceded that absence of defendant's counsel was in error and resentencing was therefore necessary. Id. See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135-37
(1967) (concluding that the Due Process Clause requires states to ensure right to
counsel at sentencing hearing which had been deferred until after a 30-day jail term).
7 The federal courts of appeal have been unanimous in ruling that the
presentence interview does not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. United
States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992). Because probation officers do
not act on behalf of the prosecution, a presentence interview conducted by the officer
does not present a "critical stage" of the prosecution requiring counsel. Id. at 939;
United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers,
899 F.2d 917, 921-22 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844-45
(7th Cir. 1989).
8 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) (2). See id. (guaranteeing that "[o]n request, the defendant's counsel is entitled to notice and a reasonable opportunity to attend any
interview of the defendant by a probation officer in the course of a presentence investigation"). But see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the Court, in a
capital murder case, addressed an issue relating to a pretrial psychiatric examination
conducted for the purpose of determining competency to stand trial. Id. at 463, 47071. The Court held that such examination could not be the basis for doctor's testimony at death sentencing hearing, because Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
implicated as a result of the "'critical stage' of the aggregate of the proceedings
against the defendant." Id. at 470.
9 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984). In Spaziano, the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment in capital case was held not to be constitutionally
binding upon the trial judge imposing a death sentence. Id. at 461-63.
10 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (explaining that the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt is one of the "essentials of due process and fair
treatment").
11 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). In McMillan, a state statute
prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence if the judge found by a preponderance of
evidence that defendant "visibly possessed [a] firearm" in committing the crime. The
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The primary constitutional protection at sentencing is the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 12 Due
Process protects the criminal defendant from being sentenced
based on materially inaccurate information."3 It also requires that
the defendant have some meaningful opportunity to challenge the
information on which the sentence is based.1 4 However, the
United States Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional restriction on the source of evidence to be considered in
sentencing. Accordingly, hearsay has traditionally been held fairly
admitted at the sentencing.
In Williams v. New York,15 a trial judge overruled ajury's recommendation of life imprisonment and sentenced the defendant to
death for first-degree murder. The defendant claimed that his due
process rights had been violated by the trial court's reliance on the
PSR, which related reports of burglaries for which he had not been
convicted and other disparaging background information. The
Supreme Court found that federal and state courts have traditionally drawn on the broadest sources of information about a convicted defendant. The Court concluded that the Due Process
Clause did not limit courts from considering unsworn or out-ofcourt information relative to the circumstances of the crime and
the convicted person's life and characteristics. Further, the Court
distinguished sentencing from other phases of a criminal proceeding, stating that the proceeding was not properly limited by the
rules of evidence governing determinations of guilt at trial. 6 AddiCourt held that because the fact is not an element of guilt for the offense, the preponderance standard was constitutional. Id. at 87-88, 91-93.
12 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: "No
person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
....
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part: "No
State shall . ..deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (sentencing defendant based
upon "assumptions concerning his criminal record which were materially untrue"
held to violate due process). Accordingly, prior convictions obtained in violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot fairly be considered in enhancing the
sentence. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972).
14 See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360-62 (1977) (holding that a capital
sentence based in part on information in PSR that defendant had no opportunity to
contest is unconstitutional).
15 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
16 Ironically, the Williams Court contrasted the guilt phase of trial-governed by
formal rules of evidence-as designed in part by the necessity of preventing a "timeconsuming and confusing trial on collateral issues." Id. at 246-47. As will be demonstrated, the irony is that federal courts today declare that not using the Federal Rules
of Evidence prevents time-consuming sentencing trials.
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tionally, federal courts have consistently read Williams to support
the conclusion that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend17
ment does not apply at sentencing.
B.

Common Law Procedure

Historically, few procedural protections are afforded criminals
facing sentence in the federal courts. The accused has a right of
allocution under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 to speak
on his own behalf prior to the imposition of sentence. 8 Beyond
this, however, sentencing judges in this country have customarily
conducted sentencing hearings on their own terms.
For nearly a century prior to 1987, federal sentencing was an
"indeterminate" system. Criminal statutes carried penalties such as
imprisonment, fines, or probation and essentially only limited sentencingjudges by prescribing the maximum imprisonment or fine.
A sentence within the statutory range was within the court's discretion and insulated from appellate review. The actual length of imprisonment was left to the United States Parole Commission, which
determined whether and when to return the offender to society
under the "guidance and control" of a parole officer.1 9
Consistent with a "rehabilitation" model of criminal justice,
judges were charged with predicting the defendant's future conduct and general potential to abide by the law. To assist in this
daunting task, judges were accorded the broadest latitude in drawing on sources of information concerning "the defendant's character and propensities"2" and "every [other] aspect of his life."2 1
Accordingly, federal courts have long sanctioned receipt of information from all manner of sources. Statements of law enforcement officials and victims have long been received by federal
judges in the privacy of their chambers2 2 and on the record. 3
17 See United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 398-401 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1592
(1993); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497
U.S. 1038 (1990).
18 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[b]efore imposing sentence, the Court must ... address the defendant personally and determine whether
the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence." FED. R. Cimi. P. 32(c) (3) (C).
19 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1989).
20 Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
21 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1949) (emphasizing that probation
officers responsible for making presentence reports are trained to aid-not to prosecute-criminal offenders).
22 Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 781
(1943), reh'g denied, 319 U.S. 783 (1944). In Stephan, upon a treason conviction, a trial
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Judges are free to summon information from defense counsel that
might be germane to the sentence. 24 They may also subpoena witnesses whose testimony would not have been admissible on the issue of guilt or innocence.2 5 In 1970, Congress codified the rule by
statutorily prohibiting any limits to the sources of the sentencing
26
judge's data on the defendant.
C. FederalRules of Evidence
Sentencing hearings are expressly outside the scope of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(d) excludes them in the same way as grand jury proceedings, arrest and
search warrant applications, and bail and suppression hearings. 7
Courts and commentators have emphasized that the sentencing
judge must be allowed to employ less rigid procedures for proofs
28
than those that apply in determining guilt at trial.
One traditional justification for distinguishing sentencing is
thatjudges are better equipped thanjuries to discriminate between
reliable and unreliable hearsay.2 9 By employing a preponderance
judge interviewed in his chambers the defendant, defendant's wife, FBI agents, the
chief probation officer, defense counsel, and prosecutors. Although the Sixth Circuit
believed that the better practice would be to conduct an open hearing, the resultant
death sentence was held not to constitute an abuse of discretion. Id. at 100.
23 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 556 (1980) (stating that "'a ... judge
may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to
the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come"')
(quotation omitted).
24 See Stobble v. United States, 91 F.2d 69, 71 (7th Cir. 1937) ("After the court had
found [defendant] guilty, it was quite proper for it to acquire any available information ... which would enable it to properly determine the appropriate punishment.").
25 Hunter v. United States, 149 F.2d 710, 711 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
787 (1946).
26 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, PA. 91-452, 84 Stat. 951. The statute,
formerly codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3557, now § 3661, provides: "No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(1992).
27 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[tihe rules do not apply" to sentencing. FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3).
28 See United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989). In McDowell,
the Third Circuit held that a preponderance standard is appropriate for resolving
disputed facts at sentencing. Id. at 290-91. In doing so, the court stressed the "long
history of judicial sentencing and strong policy reasons, including judicial economy,
persuade [courts] that a defendant's rights in sentencing are met by a preponderance
of evidence standard." Id. at 291.
29 See generally Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury cases, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1362
(1972); see also Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at
Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED.
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standard and accepting hearsay-requiring only that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to rebut it and that the court find it
reliable-sentencing proceeds quickly. At sentencing, there is no
the delay inherent in presenting witnesses who are the source of
hearsay statements, whether the facts consist of prior convictions or
the defendant's role in the offense of conviction. Many courts candidly state that the purpose of excepting sentencing from the Federal Rules of Evidence is to prevent the hearing from becoming a
"full-blown trial" with an endless parade of witnesses.3 0
III.
A.

THE

PSR's TRADITIONAL ROLE

IN SENTENCING

Background-FederalProbation

Federal probation was borne of the original Probation Act of
March 4, 1925.31 The statute conferred upon federal judges the
power to direct probation eight years after the Supreme Court had
held that they had no inherent authority to suspend a sentence
provided by Congress.3 2 Under the Probation Act, the judges of
each federal judicial district were authorized to appoint one or
more probation officers to monitor persons who had been sentenced to probation and report to the court regarding their compliance with conditions of probation. Probation officers employ
"all suitable methods" to help probationers and to improve their
"conduct and condition."3 3 Traditionally, they have supervised
their charges by summoning them to monthly meetings while monitoring their employment, social contacts, and travel.3 4 If the ofSErr. REP. 96 (1992) ('Juries, either because they are unsophisticated or irrational, or
both, must be shielded from inadmissible evidence whereas, judges, by virtue of their
training, can rationally and unemotionally reach a decision completely ignoring the
improper evidence.").
30 United States v. Johnson, 997 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1993).
31 Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259.
32 See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 49-50 (1916) (rejecting suggestion that
courts could suspend sentence upon condition that the defendant would remain on
"good behavior").
33 Act of March 4, 1925, ch. 521, sec. 4, 43 Stat. 1259, 1260.
34 The Code of Federal Regulations lists standard conditions for persons released
from custody on probation (now known as "supervised release") which are typical of
those long imposed at common law:
(3) The parolee shall not leave the limits fixed by his certificate of parole without written permission from the probation officer; (4) The parolee shall notify his probation officer within two days of any change in
his place of residence; (5) The parolee shall make a complete and
truthful written report... to his probation officer between the first and
third day of each month [and] report to [the] officer [as directed]; (6)
The parolee shall not violate any law, nor shall he associate with persons
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ficer learned of violations of the conditions, he3 5 must advise the
36
court and can arrest the probationer without a warrant.
Probation officers thus traditionally specialized in rehabilitating offenders through their supervisory efforts. The officers' attitudes toward offenders have generally been influenced by that role
37
and they were viewed as social workers employed by the courts.
Under current law, probation officers still supervise probationers.
However, the primary responsibility for persons who have been
committed to the Attorney General's custody by sentence and parole now rests with the Bureau of Prisons; the role of the Probation
Service is an ancillary one.38 Additionally, probation officers are
still charged with writing PSRs, which were first addressed by rule
in 1933. 39
B.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)

The Rules Committee initially designed the PSR to give the
sentencing court a complete picture of the defendant who is to be
sentenced and of the conduct which resulted in the conviction.
The PSR typically included information from all nature of sources
on the subject. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 required
that comprehensive data on the "defendant's history and characteristics" be included along with any other circumstances which affect his behavior.4
Most PSRs thus included details on the
defendant's family and upbringing, schooling, employment,
health, acquaintances, and spirituality. One deputy chief U.S. probation officer described the PSR as "a narrative of the individual
from the day of his birth to the moment of his conviction."4 1 The
engaged in criminal activity... (8) parolee shall work regularly unless
excused by his probation officer ....
28 C.F.R. § 2.40 (1995).
35 I use the pronoun "he" throughout this paper in referring to probation officers,
judges, and defendants for ease of reference, and ask the reader to understand that it
refers to both males and females.
36 18 U.S.C. §§ 3603(9) and 3606 (1992).
37 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785 (1973) ("The parole officer's attitude
towards [revocation] decisions reflects the rehabilitative rather than punitive focus of
the probation/parole system").
38 18 U.S.C. § 3603(a)(4)-(6).
39 See Rules of Practice and Procedure, after plea of guilty, verdict or finding of
guilt, in Criminal Cases brought in the District Courts of the United States and in the
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, 292 U.S. 661. (1934). After a plea or
verdict of guilty, a court is to impose sentence without delay unless, among other
reasons, the condition or character of the defendant or other pertinent matters
should be investigated before final imposition of the sentence. Id. at 661-62.
40 FED. R. CRrM. P. 32(b) (4) (A).
41 Garry Sturgis, U.S. v. Barry: They've OnlyJust Begun; A Web of Appellate, Sentencing,

1996]

SENTENCING UADER THE GUIDELINES

553

investigation would include not only the defendant's attitude toward the offense, but also his hobbies, ambitions, religion, and
general tendencies.4 2 The defendant, family members, former associates, and public records were consulted in an effort to generate
"an objective, unbiased report leaning neither to the defense nor
the prosecution."4 3 Such information was thought to enhance the
court's understanding of the background on the defendant's character beyond that usually revealed at trial or at the time of a guilty
plea.
While the PSR's primary purpose is, of course, to assist the
court in determining the appropriate sentence, it is also intended
for long-term use by agencies other than the sentencing court. For
example, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons utilizes the report to classify
the offender for placement, programming, and release planning.
Similarly, prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, the PSR guided the
U.S. Parole Commission in deciding parole issues. The PSR also
assists probation officers in their supervisory duties during probation and, formerly, parole. Finally, the report serves as a source of
information for future research.4 In summary, the need for accurate information about the offender extends beyond simply ensuring that the sentence was well grounded. The information extends
to become a permanent resource influencing the defendant's continuing custody and supervision.
IV.

THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

An overview of the Guidelines is essential for understanding
the transformation undergone by the PSR in the last decade. The
following provides a capsule description of the primary features of
45
the Guidelines.
Retrial Issues Still Looms, LEGAL TIMES, August 20, 1990, at 1 (quoting Arthur Carrington of the U.S. Probation Office in the District of Columbia).
42 Pre-Sentence Investigation and Report, 2 FED. PROBATION 9 (1938). See id. at 10
(including topics in a "suggested outline" for the PSR).
43 Id. at 9.
44 United States v. Belgard, 694 F. Supp. 1488, 1502-08 (D. Or. 1988), affd, 894
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 860 (1990) (citing PROBATION DmviSION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT

1 (Jan. 1978) (hereinafter Publication 105)). See United States v. Charmer

Industries, Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1170 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1983) (detailing the use of the
PSR by corrections officials in addition to the court).
45 The official publication for applying the Guidelines is the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1994). See Stinson v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993) ("[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution, or a federal
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.").
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In 1987, the Guidelines took effect to govern sentencing for
crimes committed after its effective date.4 6 Through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency of the judicial
branch charged with the promulgation of guidelines to bring uniformity to sentencing of defendants with similar criminal records
and convicted of the same offense.4 7 Accordingly, these two factors
are the primary determinants of a sentence.
The Guidelines as promulgated4 establish sentencing ranges
by use of a grid, with the seriousness of the offense of conviction on
the vertical axis and the defendant's prior criminal history on the
horizontal. 4 9 The grid-or "Sentencing Table"-sets forty-three
offense levels and six criminal history levels." ° The sentence is determined at the intersection of categories of offenses, referencing
the "offense level," and offenders, that is, the "criminal history category." Both factors are arranged in order of increasing severity.5 1
The first step under the Guidelines is to find a "base offense
level" for the specific offense: Appendix A to the Guidelines lists
federal offenses and refers to Chapter 2, which details the types of
criminal conduct and lists an offense level for each. For example,
the Guidelines differentiate between types and quantities of controlled substances distributed and ascribe different graded offense
levels for each.5 2 The second step is to find the guideline in Chapter 2 that identifies "specific offense characteristics" of the crime
and prescribes increases in the base offense level for each. An example of such a characteristic for a drug offender is possession of a
firearm; such a finding results in increasing the offense two
levels.5 Third, the base offense level may be adjusted further depending on whether there is a special type of victim, the defendTwo other expert Guidelines sources for the practitioner include THOMAS W. HUTCHISON & DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACricE (2d ed. 1994) and the
two-volume work, GERALD T. McFADDEN ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING MANUAL (1994).
46 The United States Sentencing Commission, created by the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, drafted the Sentencing Guidelines. Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat.
1837 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3674 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1992)).
47 28 U.S.C. § 991 (b) (1)(B).
48 The Guidelines and amendments thereto are officially published by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts in the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (November 1994) (hereinafter "U.S.S.G").
49 U.S.S.G., Ch. 5, pt. A, comment (n.1).
50 Chapter 5 of the Guidelines, part A, contains the Sentencing Table. See id.
51 This summary of Guidelines procedure is outlined in Chapter 1, Part B of the
Sentencing Guidelines, "General Application Principles." U.S.S.G. § 1.B1.1.
52 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (Drug Quantity Table).
53 U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
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ant's role in the offense, or obstruction of justice. Chapter 3
specifies these factors. 54 Fourth, if there are multiple counts of
conviction, the Guidelines require that the first three steps be repeated for each of the counts.55 Fifth, if the defendant accepted
responsibility for the offense, Chapter 3 allows for a decrease of the
offense level by one or two levels.
These calculations result in the "total offense level," which
provides a number (1-43) to assign to the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table. The other determinant under the Guidelines is the
"criminal history category" found on the horizontal axis of the
grid. Chapter 4 assigns points for prior criminal convictions depending upon the length of sentence.5 6 The chapter also requires
that points be added if defendant committed the current offense
while in custody or under supervision by virtue of a previous conviction in any jurisdiction.5 7 The Guidelines mandate that all felony offenses be counted, generally restricting the consideration of
misdemeanors and petty offenses.5 8 The defendant's scoring on
criminal history places him in one of six categories, and the intersection of that level with the offense level prescribes a sentence
ranging from zero to six months to life imprisonment.9 The SRA
authorized the Sentencing Commission's guidelines to take into
account "the circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense."6"
As a result, the Sentencing Guidelines analyze the current offense
54 For example, obstruction of justice may be demonstrated when the defendant
threatens a witness or destroys evidence. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Such an obstruction results and results in increasing the offense level by two levels. Id. In addition, upward
adjustments for specific types of victim include a two-level adjustment for a "vulnerable" victim (U.S.S.G. § 3.A1.1) and a three-level upward departure when the victim is
a government employee. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.2.
55 U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.1(d) (citing U.S.S.G., Ch. 3, pt. D).
56 The Guidelines "award" points for prior convictions as follows:
(a) Add 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month; (b) Add 2 points for each prior sentence of
imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a); (c) Add 1 point
for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4
points for this item.
U.S.S.G. § 4Al.1.
57 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.l(d)-(e). "Supervision" status includes probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, and escape. See id.
58 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Specified categories of petty offenses and misdemeanors
(such as gambling, prostitution, and trespass) are not counted unless: "(A) the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at
least thirty days; or (B) the prior offense was similar to the instant offense." Id.
§ 4A1.2(a).
59 U.S.S.G., Ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table.
60 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (4) (1992).
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by considering those facts necessarily present as elements of the
crime for which the defendant was convicted. The defendant's
"relevant conduct," which defines the offense, includes acts "during, in preparation of, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility" for the offense.6 1 Relevant conduct also
includes other crimes which form part of the same "course of conduct or common scheme or plan" as the offense of conviction.6"
Courts must use the Guidelines to fix the sentence in all cases
unless (1) the Government moves for a downward departure from
the prescribed sentence on grounds that the defendant has furnished "substantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution
of another person;6 3 or (2) the court finds (with or without either
parties' request) that the Guidelines do not consider adequately
consider facts presenting unique aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.6 4
The SRA further increased the stakes for sentenced defendants by abolishing the United States Parole Commission and the
possibility of parole. Sentences under the guidelines are "true"
prison terms not reducible by any other agency. In combination
with mandatory minimum sentences, the result for many defendants is a judgment and commitment order mandating their longterm incarceration.6 5 The Guidelines have been upheld against
The Guidelines provide:
Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense
characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter 3, shall be determined on the basis of the following: All acts and omissions committed, aided, counseled, commanded,
induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (A).
62 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a) (2).
63 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. provides that, upon such a motion, the appropriate reduction
shall be determined for stated reasons which may include:
(1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of [it]; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any
information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature
and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any
danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his
assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id.
64 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1992); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. If a court so finds, its "departure"
from the Guidelines may be appealed by the party opposing the departure. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3742(a)(3) and (b)(3).
65 The good news for such defendants is that they may appeal their sentences on
the grounds of an erroneous application of the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (a) (2).
Under prior law of indeterminate sentences, as in most jurisdictions that do not have
61

1996]

SENTENC1NG UNDER THE GUIDELINES

557

constitutional challenges arguing that the framework of the U.S.
66
Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers principles
and that the "relevant conduct" Guideline violates the Double
67
Jeopardy Clause.
V.

ANALYZING THE

PSR's FUNCTIONS AND EVIDENTIARY ROLE

Under the Guidelines, the PSR is a critical tool for the court in
fixing the appropriate sentence. The PSR-the probation officer's
work product-fulfills several vital roles under the Guidelines.
Although the PSR was historically a document intended for the
judge's eyes only, it is now disclosed to the defendant as a matter of
course. The report will often charge the defendant for the first
time with criminal conduct or acts potentially increasing the punishment for which he has been convicted. In this regard, it is
analogous to a pleading, in which allegations limit the potential
scope of trial. Similarly, while former practice saw the judge rely
on the PSR as a source of factual information, the report's eviden-

tiary status was never as crucial to the resulting sentence as it is
today. The PSR is now frequently cited as a reliable source proving
the facts it recites, often of a hearsay nature. Finally, the probation
specific guidelines for sentencing, defendants who were sentenced to a term of years
within a statutory range of sentences had no right to appeal. As will be seen, however,
the bad news for defendants relates to the deferential standard of review for facts
determining the sentence under the Guidelines, which insulate the findings from
piercing scrutiny on appeal.
The ironic aspect of practice under the Guidelines is the enormous litigation
spawned by their procedures. Although sentencing is a streamlined process in which
the "endless parade of witnesses" is routinely avoided and no "full-blown" trial ensues,
appeals are routine and clog the courts of appeal. The Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts reported that between 1989-93, federal criminal appeals increased 33% and
attributed the rise to appeals newly-authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act. Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, FederalJudicial Caseload: A Five-Year Review, 19891993.
Moreover, a national legal newspaper reported that, between 1988-92, nearly
one-half of all federal appeals involved issues under the Sentencing Guidelines. Cris
Carmody, Sentencing Overload Hits the Circuits: AppellateJudges Stagger Under GuidelineGenerated Appeals, NAT'L L.J., April 5, 1993, at 1.
66 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411-12 (1989) (noting that neither
the Sentencing Reform Act's delegation of legislative authority to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission for the promulgation of Guidelines nor vesting in the President the
power to remove Article III judges from the Commission violate constitutional strictures of separation of powers).
67 Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995). In Witte, the Court clarified that
under the Guidelines, imposition of a sentence is "punishment" only for offense of
conviction; therefore, the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated
by considering as "relevant conduct" other acts for which the defendant had been
previously charged and convicted. See id.
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officer's role of assessing the relevant offense conduct and criminal
history of the defendant on the Guidelines grid is a quasi-judicial
function akin to that of a federal magistrate judge.
A.

The PSR as a ChargingDocument

A PSR under the Guidelines is designed to frame factual and
legal issues for sentencing. Contrasting this practice with traditional models of civil and criminal pretrial practice reveals that the
report performs notice and issue-defining functions more akin to
civil pretrial procedures than those governing criminal charges. In
particular, unlike a general plea of guilty or not guilty to an initial
charge, defendants must specifically challenge all facts contained
in the PSR that they contend are inaccurate; if they do not, they
waive their right to contest them at sentencing. Although probation officers have traditionally "charged" persons under their supervision with violations in prosecuting revocation of probation,6 8
their charging role under the Sentencing Guidelines is much more
prominent.
For purposes of comparing the PSR's pleading function, a
brief overview of civil and criminal pleading and pretrial procedures may be helpful.
1.

Federal Rtiles of Civil Procedure

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains a general "notice" requirement for pleading a claim. All that is required
in a complaint is a "short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."6 9 The sufficiency of the complaint's factual allegations may be challenged by a motion for more
a definite statement. 70 However, the motion will not be granted
unless the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the adverse party
cannot reasonably be able to frame a responsive pleading. 71 A
court may also dismiss a pleading for failure to allege an actionable
claim, 72 but such motion will be denied unless it appears beyond
68 See Schiff v. Dorsey, 877 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding that an officer's petition to revoke probation initiates "adversarial proceedings").
69 FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(1).

70 FED.

R. Civ. P. 12(e).

In practice, a motion for a more definite statement is restricted to cases where a
pleading suffers from "unintelligibility rather than the want of detail." United States
v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 73 F.R.D. 460 (D. Del. 1977) (citing 2A JAMES W.
12.18[1], at 2389 (2d ed. 1975) and 5
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1376
(1990).
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
71
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doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove any set of facts that
would justify relief under the law.7" This is plainly a liberal standard designed to promote trial on the merits by delaying scrutiny
of evidentiary support for disputed facts until trial. Such a practice
also confirms that the civil complaint performs a largely "noticegiving" function.
Defendant's answer to a civil complaint must respond to each
and every allegation by admission, denial, or disclaiming the requisite knowledge to do either."4 Matters admitted are not issues for
trial and may provide the basis for disposing of the case on a motion for summary judgment.7 5 Matters denied will generally be the
focus of reciprocal discovery. In any event, the pleadings serve as a
first attempt at narrowing the factual issues for trial.
The pleading rules are supplemented by the rules of discovery,
summary judgment, and mandatory pretrial conferences-all of
which further narrow the factual issues for trial. The discovery
rules authorize and regulate the scope and enforcement of procuring testimonial and physical evidence for trial, both from the adversaries and from witnesses. Interrogatories, depositions, and
requests for production of documents are the most common discovery devices; the frequency or order of their use is essentially
unrestricted in the absence of a protective order.7 6 In most cases,
discovery will be the subject of a scheduling order issued after one
or more pretrial conferences.7 7
The motion for summary judgment allows a party to obviate
the need for a trial by persuading the court that there is no real
dispute regarding the facts and that the only issues presented by
73 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
74 FED. R. Crv. P. 8(b).
75 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIWL PROCEDURE § 5.18, at 284-85 (2d ed. 1993)
("Unless the answer is amended, [admissions in the answer] will bind defendant at
trial and obviate any need by plaintiff to offer proof on the matters admitted.").
76 The federal practice rules provide in part:
Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that a party is
conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d).
77 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a) encourages the court to convene pretrial
scheduling conferences to explore "discouraging wasteful pretrial activities," including unnecessary discovery. Specifically, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c) (6) authorizes the court to control and schedule discovery by protective orders. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) directs the attorneys to meet and confer in advance of
the initial scheduling conference in order to agree upon a planned course of
discovery.
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the case are legal ones.7 8 Because the judge (and not the jury)
decides questions of law, a "summary" judgment-that is, a judgment without a trial-will often determine the question of
79
liability.
Finally, prior to trial in nearly every civil case, a final pretrial
conference is held to preview the trial's scope and to promote an
orderly trial.8 ° The assigned judge conducts the pretrial in most
cases inasmuch as the conference provides the court with an opportunity to prepare it for its role in presiding at trial.8 1 Many local
rules require that the parties present pretrial orders in exhaustive
detail of claims and contested issues of fact and law, listing potential witnesses, exhibits, elections of trial witnesses who will be called
to testify, estimating the required time for the trial, and reporting
the status of settlement negotiations.8 2
Federal civil procedure is an elaborate pretrial system.
Although most civil cases settle, their pretrial phase can last a few
months or a few years. That time is largely dedicated to the pursuit
of narrowing the issues for trial using the discovery and summary
judgment devices.
2.

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Criminal pleading and pretrial rules, on the other hand, define a more streamlined set of procedures. Rule 7 requires only
that the indictment allege a "plain, concise, and definite" statement of the "essential facts" constituting the charge.8 3 Rule 12 allows for a motion challenging the sufficiency of the indictment."
An indictment is sufficient, however, if it pleads all of the essential
78 FED. R. Crv. P. 56.

79 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) ("Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an
integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."') (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 56).
80 The federal practice rules provide:
Any final pretrial conference shall be held as close to the time of trial as
reasonable under the circumstances. The participants at any such conference shall formulate a plan for trial, including a program for facilitating the admission of evidence. The conference shall be attended by at
least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the
parties and by any unrepresented parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(d)
81 SeeJ. Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, 148 (1962).
82 See E.D. MIcH Loc. R. 16.2(b) (1995).
83 FED. R. CaiM. P. 7(c)(1).
84 FED. R. CumI. P. 12(b) (2) provides that among the motions that must be made
before trial are "defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment," besides
those based on jurisdictional grounds or failure to charge an offense.
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elements of the offense, fairly informs the defendant of the charge,
and gives such information as would allow him to plead double
jeopardy as a bar.8 5 Courts read indictments liberally, and they will
ordinarily be upheld unless no reasonable construction of the allegations would charge an offense.8 6
Criminal defendants must respond to indictments at a formal
arraignment in court. The court reads the charges and calls for a
plea to the whole of it."7 The plea is thus a "general" one-guilty,
not guilty, or nolo contendere"-which addresses all of the charges
at once.8 9 The defendant is not required to take issue with discrete
factual allegations as in a civil case. Rather, his plea of not guilty
puts all facts alleged in the indictment at issue.9 0
The pretrial phase in the criminal case includes generous discovery rights for the defendant. Under Rule 16, a defendant is entitled to receive copies of his statements in the Government's
possession, his prior criminal record, and all documents and things
that are either material to his defense or intended to be used
against him." The defendant, however, is not entitled to statements made by other witnesses prior to their testifying on direct
examination at trial. 92 Besides Rule 16, due process entitles the
defendant to demand production of evidence favorable to his defense, so-called Brady material.9"
Pretrial proceedings in the criminal case thus focus on afford85 United States v. Hamling, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (maintaining that an "indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and, second, enables
him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar to future prosecutions for the same
offense") (citing Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932)).
86 See, e.g., United States v. Frankel, 721 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1983). In Franke4
the federal appeals court upheld a district court's dismissal on the grounds that the
indictment's allegation that defendant's presentation of a worthless check was not a
"false statement" and therefore could not support a charge of mail fraud under federal mail fraud statute. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976)).
87 FED. R. GRIM. P. 10.
88 FED. R. CRIM. P.ll(a)(1).
89 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 n.4 (1961) ("Under federal law an arraignment is a sine qua non to the trial itself-the preliminary stage where the accused
is informed of the indictment and pleads to it, thereby formulating the issue to be
tried.").
90 I-lARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE

§ 13.10 n.7 (1992) (citing United States v. Holby, 345 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 477 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1973)).
91 FED. R CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)-(E).
92 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a). Rule 26.2(a) restates the requirement of theJencks
Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1992).
93 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("Suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evi-
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ing the accused notice of the charges and, to a more limited degree, the evidence against him. They are only indirectly concerned
with narrowing issues for the trial. Stipulations of fact are usually
made, if at all, in a negotiated guilty plea agreement encompassing
all issues under Rule 11."
3.

The Charging Function of the PSR

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides that the PSR
frame the factual and legal issues and that they be tested at an adversary hearing. As noted above, Rule 32 was amended by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to provide that the report include the
classification of the offense, the defendant, and the resulting sentencing range under the Guidelines.9 5 The result has been to
transform the PSR from a background summary to a critical document for the parties and the court. The PSR sets out recommended findings on the two major determinants-offense level
and offender status-for the court to employ at sentencing. A major task of the probation officer is to provide the court with verifiable information it may employ in making those findings.9 6 The
PSR also performs an equally important function in notifying the
defendant of the probation officer's assessment of relevant conduct and of facts that justify adjustments to the base offense level.
Rule 32 has also been continually amended to afford the defendant (as opposed to simply the sentencing judge) notice of the
probation officer's position of what the facts and law governing his
offense are, and to allow the defendant to object to and rebut the
assertions before the sentencing judge. An outline of this progressive trend toward disclosure of the factual and legal basis for the
sentence reveals the unmistakable notice-giving function of the
PSR.
a.

The Probation Officer's Charging Task

Although the district court is required to apply the Guidelines
in arriving at a criminal sentence, the calculations are made in the
first instance by the probation officer. Rule 32 mandates that the
PSR contain "the classification of the offense and the defendant"
under the Guidelines "as the probation officer believes to be applidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.") (emphasis added).
94 FED. R. CIuM. P. 11(e).
95 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd
Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3340.
96 Publication 105, supra note 44, at 2.
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cable to the defendant's case."9' 7 In particular, the officer must describe the "relevant conduct," which determines the base offense
level and specific offense characteristics under the Guidelines.
The Guidelines require that the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, and other adjustments consider all of the defendant's "relevant conduct," defined to include all acts committed
by the defendant while committing the offense for which he was
convicted, or while planning to do so or attempting to avoid responsibility for it.9 8 The relevant conduct provision has been construed to mandate consideration of conduct that has not been the
subject of conviction, including conduct for which the defendant
has been acquitted. 9 By identifying the defendant's conduct, isolating the applicable Guidelines, and articulating the resulting
range of sentence, the probation officer serves notice to the defendant of his potential exposure.
b.

Disclosure of the PSR to the Defense

The last generation has seen an evolution from no disclosure
of the PSR to mandatory disclosure. Prior to 1966, there was no
requirement that PSR reports be revealed to the defendant. In
fact, PSRs have been routinely disclosed to the defendant and his
counsel only since 1974.100 Rule 32 now requires disclosure of the
PSR to defendant no less than thirty-five days before the sentencing hearing. 10 '
The 1966 amendment allowed that the court, before imposing
sentence, "may disclose" it to the defendant and his counsel and
afford them an opportunity to "comment" on it.10 2 Rule 32 has,
since that time, provided for disclosure of the report in advance of
97 FED. R.

CRiM. P. 32(b(4)(B).

98 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(A).

99 See United States v. Martin, 972 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming a lower
court holding that a verdict of acquittal is irrelevant and a court must increase sentence for relevant conduct if it believes the conduct occurred).
100 Arguments and recommendations for compulsory disclosure of the report had
been made by the Advisory Committee on Rules in 1944, 1962, 1964, and 1966, before
passage of the 1974 Amendment to Rule 32.
101 The rules of federal criminal procedure require that:
Not less than 35 days before the sentencing hearing-unless the defendant waives this minimum period-the probation officer must furnish the presentence report to the defendant, the defendant's counsel,
and the attorney for the Government. The court may, by local rule or
in individual cases, direct that the probation officer not disclose the probation officer's recommendation, if any, on the sentence.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 32(b) (6) (A).
102 FED. R. ClM. P. 32(c), effective July 1, 1966.
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the sentencing. As incredible as it may now seem, the rule change
displaced scores of cases holding that the defendant and his lawyer
simply had no right to examine the report for possible errors that
might be rebutted. 0 Yet some courts, notably the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, had for many years prior
to 1974 advocated that fairness urged a liberal and generous use of
10 4
the power to disclose the PSR.
In 1974, Rule 32 required that the PSR be disclosed, if requested, "[b] efore imposing sentence." The rule prescribed no advance time for the disclosure. Under this version of the Rule,
courts wrestled with the issue of fair timing. Despite this focus,
however, the case law reveals no hard and fast rules from the period. One court noted that the "better practice" was to make the
PSR available "more than five minutes before sentencing."1"5 In
1983, the Rule was further amended to require the disclosure,
whether requested by the defendant or not, at a "reasonable time"
before the sentencing hearing. 106
In 1984, the Sentencing Reform Act mandated by statute that
the PSR be disclosed at least ten days prior to the date set for sentencing." 7 The legislative history cited the PSR as a "critical factor" in sentencing and that early disclosure would facilitate
counsels' preparation to properly address the issues at the hearing.10 In recognition of the critical role that the PSR plays in
Guidelines sentencing, Rule 32 was amended further in 1994 to
conform its disclosure requirement to the statute." 9 The Rule now
provides that the PSR must be disclosed thirty-five days in advance
103 See generally Richard S. Lehrich, The Use and Disclosure of Presentence Reports
in the United States, 47 F.R.D. 225 (1969) (collecting cases and presenting historical
overview of the issue).
104 United States v. Brown, 470 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Fischer, 381 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 973 (1968).
105 United States v. Williams, 499 F.2d 52, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1974). In Williams, a defendant objected to the PSR, claiming that it contained materially untrue statements
about his role in the offense. Defendant, however, did not request an evidentiary
hearing or continuance and did not allude to evidence he wished to offer to rebut it.
The First Circuit in Williams found no error in the district court's reliance on the PSR
despite defendant's claims. Id. at 55.
106 1983 Amendments to FED. R. Cium. P. 32, Notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules. The amendments were designed to address the disparate routine practices in
federal districts in furnishing the PSR to the defense.
107 Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3552(d) (1992)). Section 3552(d) provided that the 10-day advance notice of the
contents of the PSR could be waived by the defense.
108 S. Rep. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3254-56.
109 1989 Amendments to FED. R. CRrM. P. 32, Notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules. The notes reveal that earlier disclosure was thought to be a matter of fair
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of the "sentencing hearing." 110
c.

Challenges to the Presentence Investigation Report

In addition to requiring that the PSR be furnished to the defendant thirty-five days in advance of the hearing, Rule 32 and the
Guidelines require a written response from the defendant (or prosecution) to officially take issue with its contents. While challenges
were routine in previous practice, "[ m ] ore formality is... unavoidable" if the sentencing is to be "accurate and fair" under the Guidelines.'1 1 Rule 32 requires that objections be made to the probation
officer within fourteen days of receiving a PSR addressing "material
information" and Guideline issues contained or omitted in the report.112 The officer may then conduct a further investigation and
revise the PSR if deemed appropriate. 1 ' At least seven days before
the sentencing, the officer must submit the PSR to the court and
the parties, along with an addendum detailing unresolved objections, and his views on resolving them. 1 4 The court may accept
the PSR as findings of fact with regard to matters to which counsel
does not object. 1 5
The Guidelines do not specify further pretrial or trial requirements for sentencing issues.1 1 6 Rather, the Guidelines require that
the court afford the parties the "opportunity to present information" to the court bearing on relevant facts.' 7 Under a Model Loexercise of discretion: "Nothing in the statue [sic] or the rule prohibits a court from
requiring disclosure at an earlier time before sentencing." Id.
110 FED. R. CriM. P. 32(b) (6)(A).
111 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 cmt.
112 FED. R. CIM.P. 32(b)(6).
113 Id.

114 FED. R. CuM. P. (b)(6)(C).

115 See FED. R. Cm. P. 32(b) (6) (D) ("Except for any unresolved objection under
subdivision (b)(6)(B), the court may,at the hearing, accept the [PSR] as its
findings
of fact.").
116 Regarding disclosure of the PSR, generally, the Guidelines promote the adoption of "procedures to provide for the timely disclosure of the PSR; the narrowing and
resolution, where feasible, of issues in disputed in advance of the sentencing hearing;
and the identification for the court of issues remaining in dispute." U.S.S.G. § 6A1.2.
117 See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. In the portion of the Guideline section entitled Resolution
of Disputed Factors,the Sentencing Commission advised that:

(a) When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to
present information to the court regarding that factor. In resolving any
reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial,
provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.
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cal Rule adapted in most district courts, the timing for the PSR
disclosure and objections thereto may modify the Rule 32
requirements.' 18
The defendant must take issue with all facts that he believes
are inaccurate (as well as any Guidelines applications he feels are
in error) or else be deemed to waive objection. 9 Many courts
characterize the failure to object as agreement that the facts in the
PSR are true and accurate.1 20 Further, the defendant must specifically dispute the accuracy of particular facts; it is not enough to
simply "deny" the contentions in the PSR. 121 Once a defendant
objects, the probation officer may meet with the parties to discuss
the objection or investigate the matter further.1 22 The officer may
revise the report or may be required by a court's local rule to sim23
ply file a response concerning the disputed matter.
d.

Discovery and Pre-Sentencing Conference

Although Rule 32 makes no provision for either discovery or
pre-sentencing conferences, courts have employed both on occasion. Recent years have seen defense counsel attempting to pursue
discovery of information relevant to disputed facts and, further,
facts in the Government's possession of which the defense may as
yet be unaware. However, the constitutional and rule-based obligations upon the prosecutor continue through the sentencing
124
phase.
Federal statutes and rules do not contain any express authority
for requesting presentencing conferences. While the Model Local
Rule of the Judicial Conference and most local district court rules
Id.

118 Committee on the Administration of the Probation System, Judicial Conference
of the United States, Model Local Rule for Guideline Sentencing (1987); E.D. MICH.
Loc. R. 232.1; W.D. MICH. Loc. R. 50. A specimen "Procedural Order re: Sentencing
Hearing" based upon Rule 32 may be found in LLOYD WEINREB, CRIMINAL PROCESS
1282-83 (5th ed. 1993).
119 United States v. Plisek, 657 F.2d 920, 925 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that "defendant had a full and fair opportunity to comment on the [PSR] ," but, because he failed
to do so, he waived his objection to the report's accuracy).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Pilgrim Market Corp., 944 F.2d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 1991);
United States v. Wise, 881 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 1989) (comparing PSRs that are
not objected to with pretrial stipulations in a civil case).
121 See United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that information in a PSR will be considered accurate unless the defendant raises a reasonable
factual dispute to the contrary).
122 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) (6) (C).
123 Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 134 n.3 (1991) (collecting local rules on
the practice).
124 See MCFADDEN et al., supra note 45, at
11.02[4], 11.02[1].
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contemplate that the court will at some point determine whether
an evidentiary hearing is necessary, they include no provision for
pretrial.1 2 5
e.

Adversary Hearings on FactualDisputes

The PSR and addendum reveal both the agreed-upon facts
and the disputed issues.' 2 6 Resolution of disputes need not result
in formal procedures unless the court orders a full hearing. The
Guidelines policy statement suggests that, though within the discretion of the court, trial-type hearings not be the norm. 1 7 Even with
the advent of the Guidelines, Rule 32 does not require that the
court take testimony on disputed facts.1 28 Federal courts have spe125 There are many reasons for conducting a pre-sentencing conference. Chief
among these is the benefit of resolving potential disputes by way of stipulation. Most
courts will entertain stipulations between the counsel on the offense conduct or loss
to a victim. Failing that, such a conference can offer an exchange of anticipated testimony on the disputed issues and require disclosure of potential witnesses. Moreover,
the sentencing of the convicted defendant is a traumatic event and the court appearance is an emotionally draining one. Family and friends are often present to show
support and inevitably witness the subject in a most vulnerable state. One federal trial
judge, a former chief federal defender, says that requests for adjournments of
sentencings are a common symptom of failure to conduct a pre-sentencing conference. Telephone interview with United States DistrictJudge Paul D. Borman, Eastern
District of Michigan (July 18, 1995).
126 United States v. Castellanos, 882 F.2d 474, 475 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that PSR
and addendum serve the same purpose as pretrial stipulation of factual and legal
issues in a civil bench trial).
127 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3. The commentary to § 6A1.3 provides in part:
Although lengthy sentencing hearings should seldom be necessary, disputes about sentencing factors must be resolved with care. When a reasonable dispute exists about any factor important to the sentencing
determination, the court must ensure that the parties have an adequate
opportunity to present relevant information. Written statements of
counselor affidavits of witnesses may be adequate under many circumstances. An evidentiary hearing may sometimes be the only reliable way
to resolve disputed factual issues .... The sentencing court must determine the appropriate procedure in light of the nature of the dispute, its
relevance to the sentencing determination, and applicable case law.
Id. (citing United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979)).
128 When adding the 1974 Amendments to the Guidelines, the Committee recounted that:
Experience in jurisdictions which require disclosure does not lend support to the argument that disclosure will result in less complete presentence reports or the argument that sentencing procedures will become unnecessarily protracted. It is not intended that the probation
officer would be subjected to any rigorous examination by defense
counsel, or that he will even be sworn as a witness to testify. The proceedings may be very informal in nature unless the court orders a full
hearing
FED. R CriM. P. 32(c) (3) (A), notes to 1974 amendment.
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cifically held that the decision of whether to conduct an eviden1 29
If
tiary hearing remains within the discretion of the trial judge.
130
the matter is not settled,
the court may conduct a hearing at
which time the probation officer may testify along with other witnesses. However, because the rules of evidence do not apply to
31
such hearings, the witnesses need not even be sworn.1
The trial judge's resolution of disputed facts thus resembles a
truncated form of trial. 132 Defendant's who tender guilty pleas are
told that "there will not be a trial of any kind."133 Yet the predicate
findings for the Guidelines determination indeed represent the
court's resolution of competing versions of fact. At sentencing, the
Court must make a finding on the disputed facts in the PSR or
decide that no such finding is required because the fact is irrelevant and will not be considered at trial. 134 The courts of appeal
have generally held that a defendant bears a burden of alleging
factual inaccuracies in the report.13 5 Once he does, however, the
Government assumes a burden of proving the alleged fact's accu129 United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1004 (1989).
130 One former Deputy General Counsel to the U.S. Sentencing Commission described the probation officer's role as follows:
Before sentencing, the parties will review the report and file their factual and legal objections with their probation officer. At that time, they
must specify the evidence and legal arguments that will be presented at
the sentencing hearing. Based on these objections, the probation officer may investige and prepare an addendum to the report. The report
will articulate the areas of factual dispute, the material that will be
presented in support of the respective positions, the factors that argue
for aggravation or mitigation of the sentence or departure from the
guideline range, and the sentencing decisions the court must make.
Donald A. Purday, Jr. & Michael Goldsmith, Better Do Your Homework: Plea Bargaining
Under the New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 3 CRiM. JusT. 2, 35 (1988).
131 United States v. Blyth, 944 F.2d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 1991).
132 The official manual for federal judges recognizes that resolution of such issues
requires, at a minimum, receiving exhibits and hearing testimony, yet states that
"[t]
he decision to hold an evidentiary hearing is in the discretion of the court." FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, BENCH BOOK FOR U.S. DiSrmcT COURT JUDGES, § 1.18A(7) (3d
ed. 1986).
133 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that the court advise the defendant prior to accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that if the plea is accepted, "there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading ... the defendant
waives the right to a trial." FED. R. CRrM. P. 11(c)(4).
134 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) (3) (D) provides, in part: "For each
matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a
determination that no such finding is necessary because the controverted matter will
not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing." FED. R. CRaIM. P.
32(c) (3) (D).
135 United States v. Dennino, 29 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
1117 (1995).
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racy. With regard to facts warranting upward departures, the Government bears the burden of proof, while defendant must prove
facts upon which to base a downward departure. 3 6 Factual findings need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence. 3 7
Thus, Rule 32, as amended by the Sentencing Reform Act,
contains a regime for adversarial development of the factual and
legal issues raised by the Sentencing Guidelines. Pre-sentencing
practice revolving around the probation officer's PSR has become
a unique sort of practice with its own specialists. Treatises warn
that attorneys who are preparing for Guidelines sentencing must
utilize aggressive advocacy skills on a new frontier. 3 8 Probation
officers also are working on newly-assigned duties to articulate the
offense conduct upon which the court is to base its decision.
As a result, the PSR routinely reads as if written by the defendant's adversary in ascribing criminal conduct to him. As often as
not, that conduct is extrinsic to the offense for which defendant
has been convicted-that is, it is not a part of the jury's finding of
guilt or his guilty plea. In this regard, the PSR is not simply a report of facts that were necessarily the basis of a jury's verdict or
some other such public record. Rather, the probation officer is the
functional equivalent of a "third adversary" competing with both
the Government and the defendant. 1 9 The probation officer is
not bound by the prosecutor's appraisal of which Guidelines apply
and in what manner. He is often viewed by both parties suspi136 Cases holding that the prosecutor shoulders the burden of establishing a fact
that would increase a sentence include United States v. Levy, 992 F.2d 1081, 1083
(10th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Monroe, 978 F.2d 433, 435 (8th Cir. 1992). For
a case finding that the defendant bears the burden on matters that would decrease a
sentence, see United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 943 (1989).
137 See United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
United States v. Madwell, 917 F.2d 301, 306 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the preponderance of evidence standard at sentencing satisfied due process requirements).
138 McFADDEN et al., supra note 45,
11.0211] ("[T]he sentencing guideline system

necessitates reevaluation . . .of the approach to pretrial procedures.").
139 Jerry D. Denzlinger & David D. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before
and After GuidelineSentencing,55 FED. PROBATION 49, 51 (1991). Denzlinger and Miller
explained that because the PSR now:
initiates the critical step of determining the defendant's sentencing
range, both the officer and the [PSR] have become the focus of what is
now a very adversarial sentencing system. ...[The officer] is often seen
as the "third adversary" in the courtroom, the enemy of the plea agreement, a view often simultaneously held by the judge, the Government,
and the defendant.

570

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:544

ciously as a "second prosecutor." 4 ° The PSR is generally "the primary manner by which the defendant is notified of the proposed
findings of facts and of the possibility of any departure" from the
Guidelines.14 1
Most federal courts eschew characterizing the PSR as the
equivalent of an indictment for purposes of constitutional protections such as assistance of counsel.142 Yet, in the context of making
sense of the Guidelines, they often use such terminology. 143 If not
inconsistent with the officer's other traditional roles, this aspect of
his work is one that is unique to federal employment which does
not require formal legal training. The officer is called upon to determine which facts will establish a certain offense level at a future
hearing-a classic prosecutorial role. Like the prosecutor, the probation officer deliberates the consequences of the decision to select among grades of offenses.
The Supreme Court implicitly recognized the charging function in Burns v. United States.1" Burns held that a sentencing court
could not effect a sua sponte departure from the Guidelines on a
grounds not identified in either the PSR or some other pre-sentencing hearing submission without giving reasonable notice to the
parties of its intention to do so. In addressing the defendant's
right to notice of his potential exposure under the Guidelines, the
Court observed that "[iun the ordinary case, the [PSR] or the Government's own recommendation will notify the defendant that an
upward departure will be at issue and of the facts that allegedly
140 Bunzel, supra note 1, at 962. Bunzel wrote that "the new PSR format forces the
probation officer to 'become the focus of... a very adversarial sentencing system' in
which the probation officer is in 'the business of lawyering."' Id. (quoting Judy
Clarke, Ruminations on Restrepo, 2 FED. SENT. REP. 135, 135 (1989)).
Indeed, some defendants have commissioned outside firms to present a competing PSR with that prepared under the auspices of the court. In California and other
states, privately-generated presentence reports often compete with official ones. Defendants may spend up to $5000 for private "sentencing advocates" to compile evaluations that include character references, psychological evaluations, and a community
service plan designed to persuade the court to grant probation. SeeJames Granelli,
Presentence Reports Go Private, NAT'L L.J. May 2, 1983, at 1.
141 Thomas W. Hutchison & David Yellen, supra note 45, § 6A1.3, authors' cmt. 6, at
650.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992). Cf
United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1209 n.l1 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1816 (1990) (holding that Guideline sentencing is an adversarial process, with a
PSR serving same purpose as a pretrial stipulation in civil cases).
143 United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that the Guidelines establish "an adversarial fact finding process" where the PSR initiates the process).
144 501 U.S. 129 (1991).
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support such a departure."1 4 5
4.

Conclusion

Rule 32 thus presents a system of pleading whereby the probation officer fulfills the role of "notice pleading" traditionally assigned the plaintiff in a civil case. Defendant must articulate
challenges to each and every factual and legal error in the PSR
prior to sentencing. The defendant's failure to do so waives all
future objection and thus narrows the scope of issues left for trial.
Defendant's default obviates the need for formal proof, much like
the summary judgment device in a civil case.
B.

The PSR as an Exhibit Proving Criminal Conduct

The evidentiary status of the PSR is an amorphous one. Because the rules of evidence have always been held inapplicable to
sentencing, little attention has been given to its value as evidentiary
proof. Although courts use differing formulations to define the
PSR's probative value, they all agree that it is "evidence" in some
sense.
In line with the historical practice, federal courts have considered the document to have been generated-if not "for their eyes
only"-at least for them to employ in the first instance at their discretion. The difficulty arises under the Guidelines when the defendant objects to a statement of fact in the PSR. As discussed
above, the Government is then held to assume a burden of proof
of that fact at a hearing. At such a hearing, is the PSR admissible?
The short answer is yes because the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not apply at sentencing. 46 The traditional doctrine and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661 allow no limitation on the sources of information that the
court may consider for sentencing.
Still, however, the Due Process Clause precludes reliance
upon materially inaccurate information. Rule 32(c) (3) (D), while
prescribing the means for resolution of disputed factual issues,
does not specify the evidentiary status of the PSR. The Rule provides that, as to matters alleged to be inaccurate by the defendant
or his counsel, the court must make a finding of fact on each or
determine that none is necessary because the matter will not be
considered in sentencing. The Guidelines do not require that an
evidentiary hearing be held in the event of a dispute. They simply
145 Id. at 135 & n.5. The Court saw no distinction between notification via Government submission of its version of the offense or the PSR itself. See id. at 135.
146 See generally Part HI(C), supra.
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provide that the parties shall have the opportunity "to present information to the court."1 4 7 The federal courts have consistently
construed this provision to mean that hearings are a matter of the
1 48
judge's discretion.
This part of the Article examines the PSR as evidence and contrasts that use with the treatment given government reports under
the Federal Rules of Evidence applicable at trial. The section assesses the PSR under Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which draws upon common law and state statutes long recognizing
a hearsay exception for public records. The exception generally
allows hearsay proof of the activities of a federal agency, matters
observed by its employees pursuant to a statutory duty, and factual
findings resulting from authorized investigations. Police records,
however, are categorically excluded from the exception and cannot be used in a criminal trial. The anomoly of practice under the
Guidelines is that crimes (and other relevant facts) are routinely
proven through those same law enforcement reports inasmuch as
the reports often serve as the basis for information contained in
the PSR. Because the probation officer's position is in many respects aligned with law enforcement, this section suggests that the
traditional suspicions reflected in the Federal Rules of Evidence
demand courts' strict adherence to the requirement that hearsay
statements be found reliable before they are considered at
sentencing.
1.

The PSR's Evidentiary Status as a Conduit for Hearsay

Most federal courts consider the completed PSR as prima facie
proof of the facts it contains, to the extent that the defendant has
not taken issue with them. In line with the waiver principles in
Rule 32 (discussed in Part V(A) (3) above), if the defendant did not
specifically object to facts in the PSR, the court may rely on those
The Guidelines provide:
(a) When any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an opportunity to present
information to the court regarding that factor. In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to
its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided
that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its
probable accuracy.
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (a), Resolution of Disputed Factors.
148 See United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980).
147
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facts as the sole basis for its finding. 14 9 Some courts imply that the
PSR is automatically part of the sentencing record and a proper
of a disputed fact by a preponderance of
source for determination
150
the evidence.
In cases in which the defendant has disputed facts, the Guidelines allow the court to rely upon any information so long as it
carries "sufficient indicia of reliability." 15 1 Accordingly, regardless
of the rules of evidence, hearsay statements related in the PSR may
152
be considered upon a finding that the statements are reliable.
Federal courts routinely rely upon the hearsay evidence
presented in the PSR. 15 3 One treatise on the topic finds that they
do so with "extraordinary liberality."1 54 A common scenario sees
the Government's version of the offense accepted by the probation
officer as his own and, in turn, by the court unless the defendant
can disprove it by a preponderance of the evidence. As a safeguard, courts question whether the sources of information cited by
the probation officer are demonstrably reliable.1 55 Where the PSR
alludes to a confidential informant, surrounding circumstances
must be found to sufficiently corroborate his report. 156 Still, cases
149 See, e.g., United States v. Streich, 987 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
a defendant's failure to contest allegations, as required by the court's orders, results
in court accepting the allegations as true); United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781,
791-92 (8th Cir. 1980) (in the absence of an objection, PSR alone presents a preponderance of evidence).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Adames, 56 F.3d 737, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1995).
In
Adames, the sentencing judge relied on information contained in the PSR to enhance
a sentence for a convicted drug felon. In addressing the trial court's reliance on the
PSR to establish an aggravating role in the conspiracy, the Seventh Circuit wrote that
because the "finding is supported by the trial and sentencing records, it is not clearly
erroneous." Id. at 749. See also United States v. Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 306-07 (1st Cir.
1993) (clarifying that findings may properly be drawn from the trial record, the PSR,
or a party's new information presented at the sentencing hearing).
151 See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3.
152 See United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 883 (4th Cir. 1991) (due process is
satisfied if factual evidence relied upon has some "minimal indicia of reliability");
United States v. Restrepo, 832 F.2d 146, 161 (l1th Cir. 1987).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1272 (7th Cir. 1979) (approving trial court's extensive reliance on hearsay, so long as the defendant has a
.reasonable opportunity to rebut contested hearsay").
154 DAVID J. GOTTLIEB, PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 194.7194.8 (2d ed. 1994).
155 See United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1992). In Simmons,
the Eighth Circuit held insufficient a PSR statement alluding to "information" from
trial and witness interviews that crack cocaine was distributed, without identifying
names of witnesses. Id. at 776. See also United States v. Shacklett, 921 F.2d 580, 584
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that it was clear error for court to sentence on the basis of
the PSR, which did not refer to the sources of the facts contained therein).
156 See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1463-64 (10th Cir. 1990). In Reid,
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and anecdotal evidence from prosecutors and defense counsel
alike suggest that the prosecution's "official" version157of the offense
commonly becomes the probation officer's as well.
A few common examples help to understand the trend. The
Guidelines provide that an offense level shall be increased ("enhanced") two levels if the defendant "willfully obstructed or impeded" justice.158 It is not unusual for the Government to prove
the threat or attempted escape by relying on the PSR, which simply
59
restates contents of a hearsay report from an official or witness.'
Similarly, the Guidelines call for increasing imprisonment for
higher quantities of drugs sold. Following a guilty plea or trial, the
exact amounts are tallied by the probation officer in the PSR based
upon Government reports, which in turn cite other sources of
hearsay information. 6 °
Some types of disputed hearsay receive less scrutiny of their
reliability than others. In many cases dealing with criminal history,
for example, the PSR is deemed admissible evidence to establish
prior convictions without additional corroboration.' 6 1 Even if the
the district court relied upon a PSR relating that the officer had reviewed an affidavit
by an Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent which, in turn, had reported an inmate's
statement quoting the defendant as having promised revenge against two witnesses.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the trial court's reliance on the multiple hearsay was
proper. Id. at 1464.
157 See United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 951 (7th Cir. 1991) (where judge told
the defendant that he would accept the prosecution's version in the PSR as true unless the defendant presented evidence that the challenged statements were inaccurate
or not credible); United States v. Moran, 845 F.2d 135, 139 (7th Cir. 1988) (same);
United States v. Slaughter, 900 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990) (same).
158 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 provides that obstruction includes both attempts to escape custody and threats to witnesses. See id.
159 See United States v. McGill, 32 F.3d 1138, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1994). In McGill, the
probation officer reported that he had received a written report from a prison officer
stating that, upon hearing noise in the defendant's cell, the latter officer had found
the defendant standing on top of the toilet with his head protruding through a hole
in the ceiling tiles. The officer who was said to have observed the incident did not
appear as a witness, nor was his report introduced into evidence. Instead, the probation officer testified at the sentencing hearing and related the contents of the report.
Defense counsel cross-examined the officer, suggesting that defendant's conduct may
have been a suicide attempt. The officer did not agree. His testimony was accepted
as credible and the court found the defendant guilty of a willful attempt to escape
before trial, resulting in an enhanced offense level. See generally id. See also United
States v. Nowicki, 870 F.2d 405, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that trial court may
consider hearsay report of the defendant's threat as aggravating factor).
160 United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1529 (6th Cir. 1992) (Merritt, CJ.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1595 (1993).
161 See e.g., United States v. Frushon, 10 F.3d 663, 665-66 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing sentence enhancement
based on PSR and testimony of probation employee).
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defendant denies the fact of previous convictions referenced in the
PSR, courts have considered the PSR an adequate evidentiary basis
and have rejected arguments that the denial triggers a requirement
that certified copies of those judgments be presented at sentencing. 16 This result might be justified on the grounds that law enforcement records are inherently reliable because courts' public
records of felony convictions are excepted from hearsay treatment
163
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
At the same time, some federal courts say that the PSR itself
carries no real evidentiary weight in the face of defendant's specific
challenges to facts recited therein. Courts facing the issue directly
have held that the PSR cannot be considered evidence proving the
contested issue. 164 The PSR-as opposed to the probation officer's
sworn testimony, reference to a trial transcript, or some other
source-is not "clearly reliable evidence." 165 Even if the PSR contains a narrative of facts, and not simply a conclusion of fact, it is
not competent evidence upon which a court may rely to resolve
contested issues. 166 In accordance with the view that the PSR is not
162 United States v. Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 1995). In Watkins, the Third
Circuit held that a requirement of three prior violent felonies for sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) can be established by reference
to statutory citations of convictions in the presentence report. Id. at 166-67 (citing 18
U.S.C § 924(e) (1992)). The federal appellate court found no justification for inflexible rules that would require certified copies of convictions. See id. See also United
States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (ACCA "generally requires the trial court to
look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense").
163 See FED. R. EVD. 803(22).
164 See, e.g., United States v.

McMeen, 49 F.3d 225, 226 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 272-83 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1121
(1994) (stating that PSR is not evidence and is therefore not a legally sufficient basis
for making findings on contested issues of material fact).
165 United States v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1008
(1990). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the
seriousness of a 15-year mandatory enhancement under the ACCA. The court held
that the sentencing court must receive copies of judgments to determine whether
defendant had been previously convicted of violent felonies because the presentence
investigation report is not clearly reliable evidence to establish such prior convictions.
Id.
166 See, e.g., McMeen, 49 F.3d at 226. In United States v. Gadson, 829 F. Supp. 435,
438 (D.D.C. 1993), the court rejected the notion that the PSR was sufficiently reliable
to prove facts of drug transactions recited therein or that the court could take judicial
notice of the facts recited therein. See generally id. The judge noted that the probation officer's information on such facts was often furnished by the Government prosecutors. In the absence of any witnesses having been called by the Government, the
court found no preponderance of evidence presented by the PSR alone. The court
stated that it could not "accept unverified facts as true for purposes of a civil case
where no liberty interest is involved.... Therefore, the Court conclude[s] that it (is]
improper to deprive a Defendant of his liberty interest based only upon the broadly

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:544

strictly evidence, courts also look to whether it cites trial testimony
or other sources, such as government reports or witnesses.16 7
Although not bound by them, courts often justify their reliance upon hearsay in the PSR by citing to provisions of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.16 Usually, courts cite to a recognized hearsay
exception as grounds for dispatching with the objection. 6 Thus,
under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, reliance on a
"clearly recognized" exception to the common law hearsay rule fur170
nishes sufficient reliability for the statement.
As will be shown, however, the irony of current practice is that
PSRs are routinely found to be reliable based upon police reports
that would themselves be undebatably inadmissible at a criminal
trial. To compare the PSR with other government records used in
criminal trials against the defendant, a review of the evidentiary
rules governing law enforcement and investigative reports is in order. Evidence Rule 803(8), the standard for whether public
records are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, may
help one to appreciate the enhanced evidentiary value assigned to
the PSR. To the extent that PSRs routinely rely upon law enforcement agencies as the ultimate sources of facts, the policy underlying this inapplicable rule raises special credibility concerns. Is the
asserted, unverified information contained in the [PSR] in this case." Id. at 438 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 56).
167 United States v. Willard Makes Room for Them, Jr., 49 F.3d 410, 417-18 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court erred in relying on the PSR to establish defendant's aggravated role in the offense where no trial or sentencing hearing testimony was cited). See also generally McMeen, 49 F.3d at 255.
168 United States v. Castellanos, 904 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1990). In Castellanos, the sentencing judge resolved a dispute over the quantity of cocaine ascribed to
defendant in the PSR by relying on defendant's previous testimony in a co-defendant's trial. The Castellanos court upheld the enhancement, considering the finding
proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (A). See id. at 1495.
169 United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 574 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing FED. R.
EvlD. 801(d)(2)(A)); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989)
(same).
170 The seminal Supreme Court decision, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), held
that the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution offering the hearsay evidence
to demonstrate both unavailability of the declarant and "indicia of reliability" in the
evidence. Id. at 65. However, in United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), the
Court authorized receipt of co-conspirators' hearsay statements without need for
demonstrating unavailability. See id. at 399-400.
In United States v. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), the Court found the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule to be a "firmly-rooted" one carrying the requisite inherent reliability. Id. at 182-83. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990), the
Court said that the State's version of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) was not a
firmly-rooted exception and that the reliability of the statements had to be demonstrated from the totality of the circumstances surrounding them.
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court weighing the credibility of the police or the probation officer? Arguably, at least, the court is doing both, and that routine
reliance upon the probation officer's ultimate version of facts contained in the PSR deserves special scrutiny. More importantly, the
probation officer himself is in some respects a law enforcement officer whose report is given overwhelming weight under the
Guidelines.
2.

Analyzing the PSR as a "Public Record" Under Evidence
Rule 803(8)

The "public" nature of the PSR is amorphous. Although Evidence Rule 803 (8) carries no requirement that the record be "public" in the sense of being open to inspections by all persons, the
issue reveals the special treatment given the PSR by courts. The
PSR was, before the last twenty-five years, considered the court's
confidential source. 71 The report was traditionally considered to
be strictly confidential, although Rule 32 now mandates disclosure
of the PSR to the defendant and his counsel barring exceptional
172
circumstances. The PSR is not publicly filed as a court record.
Before the Rule 32 amendments for liberal disclosure, courts disclaimed publicity of the PSR as contrary to the need to procure
17
candid information from all sources, including the defendant.
Consequently, the PSR was rarely disclosed to third parties in the
course of civil or criminal discovery. 174 Despite the trend toward
early disclosure to the defendant inherent in Rule 32, courts still
refuse to acknowledge any significant public interest in the PSR
that would dictate a right of access to it by third persons. The PSR
public or the press under the
is not freely accessible by the general
1 75
Freedom of Information Act.
171 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 964 ("In these circumstances, the district judge may
be forced to pass formal judgment on the credibility and judgment of professionals
who ... should enjoy a close and confidential relationship with the district judges.").
172 See United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1266 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that
the PSR is not a prosecutorial tool, but, rather, an informative document offering
guidance to the court during sentencing).
173 See generally United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing
First Amendment and common law claims regarding general access to sentencing
materials).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Charmer Industries, Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1171 (2d Cir.
1983) (explaining that a PSR is not a public record but is a "confidential report[ ] to
the trial judge for use in his effort to arrive at a fair sentence"). See also id. at 1174
(stating that courts should allow discovery of the PSR to third persons absent "compelling showing" that the interests of justice require disclosure).
175 Cook v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1968) (ruling that United States
courts are not "agencies" under the Freedom of Information Act and, therefore, the
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Hearsay is not admissible unless authorized by statute or
rule. 176 A major exception to the hearsay bar is Evidence Rule
177
803(8), commonly known as the "public records" provision.
Rule 803(8) delineates three different classes of hearsay within its
exception: (A) records of the "activities" of an office or agency;
(B) "matters observed" under a legal obligation to do so; and (C)
"factual findings" made upon an investigation authorized by law.
The latter two categories carve out significant "exceptions to the
exception," but expressly withhold that advantage from the prosecution in a criminal case.
One of the sources of reliability of a public record is the fact
that it is "public." In the United States, records are deemed to
carry a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness when they are
created pursuant to a legal duty by a public officer. Professor Wigmore said that the reliability of public reports stemmed not so
much from their being products of "habit" common to routine
business entries, but from an "official duty" to make an accurate'
statement, which usually suffices "to incite the officer to its fulfillment."17 8 In the same vein, Professor Saltzburg writes that the exPSR is not subject to disclosure). Cf United States Dept. ofJustice v. Julian, 486 U.S.
1, 10-11 (19881 (noting that a defendant has an interest in the disclosure of his own
PSR under the Act). In this manner, the PSR is treated like FBI "rap sheets," which
are held exempt from disclosure to the public under the Freedom of Information
Act. See United States Department ofJustice v. Reporter's Committee for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (stating that rap sheets-which are computerized compilations of criminal records, including arrests, charges, convictions, and sentencesare exempt from the Act because public interest in disclosure is outweighed by the
invasion of the subject's privacy).
176 FED. R. EVID. 802. The rules of evidence define hearsay as follows: "'Hearsay' is
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EvID.
801(c).
177 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides an exception to the rule against hearsay, applying to:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public officer or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
178 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WrGMoRE ON EVIDENCE § 1632 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
Wigmore found support for this common law rule in Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. v.
United States, 240 F. 903 (3d Cir. 1917), wherein the court stated:
[W] hen a public officer is required, either by statute or by the nature of
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ception reaches public records because it is "assumed" that public
officials perform their duties properly. 7 9
Most justifications of Evidence Rule 803(8) have emphasized
efficiency rather than reliability of public records-that is, the necessity of some practical limitation on public servants' time in producing court records."' 0 Irving Younger noted that a second
rationale-preserving the integrity of original records-spawned
the practice of authenticating copies of public records. 8 '
a.

Reports of "Matters Oberved" Under Evidence Rule 803(8)(B)

The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that the following public records are admissible over a hearsay objection:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any for, of
public officer or agencies, setting forth . . . matters observed
pursuant to any duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding however, in criminal cases, matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel. 182
Evidence Rule 803(8) (B) also protects a criminal defendant's
right to confront witnesses against him by delimiting police and
investigative reports from the exception. Police reports and others
prepared by law enforcement personnel setting forth "matters observed" by them are not admissible in a criminal trial. The legislative history suggests that Congress recognized an inherent bias in
such reports against potential defendants."' 3 Any police officer obhis duty, to keep records of transactions occurring in the course of his
public service, the records thus made . . . are ordinarily admissible,

although the entries have not been testified to by the person who actually made them, and although he has therefore not been offered for
cross examination. As such records are usually made by persons having
no motive to suppress or distort the truth or to manufacture evidence,
and, moreover, are made in the discharge of a public duty, and almost
always under the sanction of an official oath, they form a well-established exception to the rule excluding hearsay and, while not conclusive, are "prima facie" evidence of relevant facts.
240 F. at 907.
179 3 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1416 (6th
ed. 1994).
180 See CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8.48 (1995)
(noting that necessity underlies the exception); WILLIAM CAHALAN, EVIDENCE REVISITED, NATIONAL DISTRICT ATToRNEYS ASSOCIATION, THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 517,
526 (2d ed. 1977).
181 IRVING YOUNGER, HEARSAY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET § 4.8

(1988).

182 FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (B).
183 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET

A.

BERGER,

4

WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
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serving a crime is duty bound to report it and writes the report as a

potential witness against the subject.184 Toward achieving the same
objectives as the Confrontation Clause at the guilt phase of trial,
police reports of criminal conduct are not admissible by the

Government.18 5
More specifically, Evidence Rule 803 prohibits reports setting
out "matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personneL"'1 8 6 The term "law enforcement personnel" has been

broadly construed in accordance with the Rule's purpose to include many public employees whose duties are auxiliary to police
and investigative agents. For example, U.S. Customs Service laboratory chemists have been found to be law enforcement personnel

because of their importance in prosecuting narcotics cases through
testimony on chemical analysis and chain of custody of seized
drugs. 18 7 Other courts, however, have held that officials only tan-

gentially related to the police are not within the scope of the limitations. 8 8

These courts consider whether the official, though

employed in a law enforcement agency or capacity, was making the
particular report as a matter of routine observation of many per8 9
sons or was focused upon a subject as a targeted perpetrator.1
803(8) [01] (1995) (citing comments of Representative Hungate in floor debate in
House of Representatives and stating that police reports would be excluded from the
exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (B) because they are "frequently prepared for use of prosecutors, who use such reports in deciding whether to
prosecute").
184 S.Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7064.
185 Although Federal Rule of Evidence 803 purports to bar such reports whether or
not the author (the "declarant") is available to testify at trial, another hearsay exception might allow use of the report if the author appears as a witness in the case.
Typically, a police report may be furnished to a witness to either refresh the witness's
recollection or, if that fails, to be read to the jury under the exception for records of
past recollection recorded (per Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (5)). See generally United
States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
186 FED. R.EvID. 803(8)(B).
187 See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67-68 (2d Cir.), on remand, 445 F.
Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 591 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978).
Similarly, border inspectors' routine observations have been held admissible
under the rule even though they might technically fit the description of "law enforcement personnel." In United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979), the court considered computerized records that the
defendant's car had crossed the Mexican border and held that such recording of
license plate numbers did not implicate the concerns of adversary confrontation that
the rule is designed to protect. See id. at 793-94.
188 United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 332 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing medical examiner's report bearing indicia of criminality because the examiners have no law enforcement training and no responsibility for enforcing the criminal laws).
189 See United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 289-91 (8th Cir. 1990) (collecting
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Are probation officers law enforcement officers? While "law
enforcement personnel" may not accurately describe federal probation officers in their capacities as authors of PSRs, their background and vantage point frequendy align them much more
closely with law enforcement than the judicial branch.
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal probation
officers' expertise in social science dominated their work of analyzing and monitoring offenders. 19 0 They relied upon the federal
prosecutors and defense counsel to furnish them with their respective factual versions of the offense. Most of the probation officer's
efforts in compiling the PSR consisted of verifying criminal history
and investigating the defendant's background.1 9 1 In line with nowdiscarded goals of rehabilitation in the federal criminal justice system, the officers routinely included in their PSRs their subjective
opinion of the defendant's capacity to change his attitude and behavior. Their recommendations on the actual sentence to be imposed were meant to consider, as appropriate, the separate
sentencing goals of deterrence, punishment, incapacitation, and

rehabilitation. 192
An additional point of reference for considering the law enforcement duties of probation officers emanates from their historical role in documenting and prosecuting violations of probation
terms. 193 The officers are authorized to make warrantless arrests
for such violations.' 9 4 Like other law enforcement officers, probation officers typically swear affidavits of facts underlying what they
cases and adopting rationale of Orozco in concluding that border-crossing observations
of customs officers is not "crime scene" or an otherwise adversarial setting within the
ambit of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (B)).
190 See Henry P. Chandler, The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2 F.R.D.
53, 66 (1941) (remarks of the Director before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference,
analogizing federal probation to "social service" agencies in urging adequate
funding).
191 John S. Dierna, Guideline Sentencing: Probation Officer Responsibilities and Interagency Issues, 53 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (1989); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the
Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681,
1722 (1992).
192 Publication 105, supra note 44, at 15-17.
193 18 U.S.C. § 3603(4) (1992).
194 Section 3606:
If there is probable cause to believe that a probationer or a person on
supervised release has violated a condition of his probation or release,
he may be arrested, and, upon arrest, shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the court having jurisdiction over him. A probation
officer may make such an arrest wherever the probationer or releasee is
found, and may make the arrest without a warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3606 (1988).
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believe to be a violation. Indeed, prior to the Guidelines, the
Supreme Court recognized state probation officers as "peace officers" affiliated with law enforcement. 195 Still, federal courts have
held that probation officers are not "law enforcement officers" for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.'9 6
Under the Guidelines, it is widely recognized that the probation officer is even more closely attuned to concerns of public
safety than under prior practice. While they still instruct probationers on the conditions of their release and work to improve the
conduct of those persons by supervision, 1 9 7 they have a concurrent
obligation to protect the public in doing so.198 Clearly, many state
probation officers today serve a role in law enforcement by monitoring the conduct of probationers.'"° Indeed, some states license
their probation officers with the arrest powers of law enforcement
officers.2 ° ° Other states involve the probation officers in many aspects of criminal investigations, such as discovering and seizing forfeitable assets. 2 1' Despite the importance to the mission of
probation, the policing aspects remain largely in the background
of the job description.20 2
In documenting facts for the PSR, the probation officer will be
195 See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 432 (1984) (probation officer "isa peace
officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with his fellow police

officers").
196 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 959 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1992); Duross v. Delaware, 494 A.2d 1265, 1270 (Del. 1985) (allowing probation officer to testify to facts in
the PSR under modified version of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) because they are
not "law enforcement officers" and reports are more routine in nature than targeted
investigations).
197 18 U.S.C. § 3603 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
198 Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the pro-

bation service guidelines impose dual obligation on probation officer to protect public and promote rehabilitation of probationer), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2705 (1994).
199 Maria E. Camposeco, Benefits Too Low to Take Risks, Probation Officers Tell Placer,
SACRAMENTO BEE, July 9, 1993, at B3 (detailing county probation officers' demand for
salary parity with street police on account of risks attending their work in appre-

hending and transporting probation violators

and conducting

unannounced

searches); Armed Probation Officers Proposed for Oakland, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
April 14, 1992, at A16 (county supervisor quoted as declaring "[c]ertainly, probation
officers are law enforcement, but they are also social workers"); Letter to the Editor,

ST. PETERSBURG TImEs, May 15, 1992, at 15A (noting that Florida probation officers
have option of carrying firearms while on duty for personal safety).
200 David Lundy, Two Cities Privatize-ProbationFirm Offers Supervision, Collects Fines,
THE ATLANTAJOURNAL AND CONsTrrTUTION, April 22, 1993, at 1 (noting that Georgia

law recognizes certified probation officers as "law enforcement officers" under state
law with arrest powers).
201 David Hasemyer, ProbationDepartment Goes After DrugAssets to Stretch Tight Budget,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 16, 1992, at A-7.

202 The New Jersey Supreme Court forbids its probation officers to maintain mem-
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privy to most of the details of the Government's investigation. In
addition, during the usual investigation, it is customary for the officer to interview case agents and the defendant. 20 3 However, it is
common knowledge among prosecutors and defense counsel that
the pressures of time upon probation officers require that they rely
upon written submissions of facts from both parties. That written
report will have been distilled from either agency investigative reports (the kind targeted by Evidence Rule 803(8) (B)) or grand
jury transcripts contained in the prosecutor's file.2 4 In many
cases, prosecutors simply furnish the probation officer with copies
of the case agent's reports. Time often does not allow the probation officer to corroborate the facts contained in those reports, and
they may thus be adopted as the facts upon which the officer bases
a decision.20 5 One survey of probation officers revealed that most
did not have the time or resources to conduct their own full investigations into the scope of the defendant's crime.20 6 In any event,
the reality is that the PRS usually reflects the Government's view of
7
offense conduct.

20

The probation officer's law enforcement slant is revealed to
the defendant when the defendant submits for his pre-sentence interview. The potential for giving the probation officer incriminating information at the pre-sentence interview is clear. Defense
counsel have therefore urged that the protections of Miranda v.
Arizona2 °8 be accorded to the defendant at that time. In Minnesota
bership in police organizations. See Kirchgesser v. Wilentz, 884 F. Supp. 901, 906-07
(D.N.J. 1995).
203 Dierna, supra note 191, at 4 (indicating that interviews with case agents are helpful and necessary).
204 See generallyJulian A. Cook, Jr., The Changing Role of the Probation Officer in the
Federal Court, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 112 (1991). The Chief United States District Court
Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the transformation of the probation officer's role and observed that
today, because of their perceived role as an adversary in the sentencing
process, probation officers are viewed by some defendants when they
appear in the probation office for the requisite presentence interview,
as working on behalf of the attorney for the government.
Id.
205 See generally id. (describing the tremendous increase in the time involved in
preparation of the PSR by probation officers).
206 Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,28 Am.
CraiM. L. REv. 161, 169 (1991).
207 Subin et al., supra note 90, § 19.9(b) (stating that, in most cases, PSRs "reflect the
government's version of events"). As a former prosecutor, the author remains open
to the suggestion that the reason for this is simply that the Government is usually right
in its version of the crime.
208 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally id. (adopting a prophylactic rule to ensure
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v. Murphy,2 °9 the Supreme Court held that Mirandawarnings need

not be given by probation officers before speaking with convicts at
meetings that are held as part of a condition of probation.
Although a defendant's pre-sentence meeting with the officer is
not "routine" in the same sense as probationary meetings, the federal courts have nearly unanimously held that the setting is not so
inherently coercive as to constitute custodial interrogation triggering the need for Miranda warnings.21 °
The 1994 amendment to Rule 32, requiring that defense
counsel, upon request, be allowed to attend any such meeting with
the probation officer recognized the significance of the interview
to the defendant." l ' Federal courts have recognized in some ways
that the officer's interview is a crucial part of the investigation of
the defendant's criminal conduct.2

12

One appellate panel ex-

pressed disbelief that a defense attorney would forego the opportunity to attend such a meeting with the client, implying the
that the warnings of both the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must precede "custodial interrogation").
209 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
210 See United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321, 1326 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1094 (1991); United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 921-24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990); United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 842 n.4 (7th Cir.
1989).
211 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b)(2).
212 Indeed, probation officers may be limited in using information gleaned from
interviewing the defendant if the prosecutor has granted immunity from its use. The
Guidelines address the situation where a plea agreement carries the defendant's
promise to cooperate in furnishing details of other suspects' unlawful conduct. If the
Government agrees that self-incriminating facts provided under the agreement will
not be used against the defendant, the cases hold that the fact that the matters were
repeated to a probation officer in the course of a presentence investigation does not
alter the immunity protections-that is, the officer may not employ the incriminating
facts to determine an applicable offense level.
The Guidelines provide:
Where a defendant agrees to cooperate with the government by providing information concerning unlawful activities of others, and as part of
that cooperation agreement the government agrees that self-incriminating information provided pursuant to the agreement will not be used
against the defendant, then such information shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline range, except to the extent provided in
the agreement.
U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.8(a) & 1B1.8 cmt.
See also United States v. Fant, 974 F.2d 559, 562-64 (4th Cir. 1992). In Fant,the
Government opposed restricted use of incriminating statements made to the probation officer on the grounds that the statements were not made to the "Government"
within the meaning of the plea agreement. Although the Fant court did not accept
the argument, other district courts have. See, e.g., Miller, 910 F.2d at 1325-26 (holding
that statements made to a probation officer cannot be construed as statements to the
Government under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8).
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existence of an adversarial setting."' The adversarial nature is
compromised, however, inasmuch as the probation officer has the
tremendous power to essentially determine the outcome.2 14
Despite the reservations about their investigative role, 5 federal probation officers continue to view themselves as separated
from law enforcement and aligned with the judicial branch. 6
Some characterize themselves as "risk managers" in their capacities
as supervisors of probationers. 7 Concerning their duty in generating the PSR, the probation officer's primary function is to document the entirety of the defendant's offense and his criminal
history. There is no longer consideration of the prognosis for rehabilitation. As a result, their inquiry of the defendant often
reveals incriminating information. While most officers recognize
the danger that their review of serious offenders may become
tainted by the bias that many of us naturally acquire against
criminals, no safeguards can fully protect against the bias. They
are cautioned to guard against it by seeking supervision or transfering the matter to another officer.2 8
United States v. Davis, 919 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (6th Cir. 1990) ("We are troubled
the lawyer's decision not to attend [the interview]. If this had been a civil case,
one wonders whether the lawyer would have let his client be deposed without counsel
being present.").
214 One commentator maps the potential scenarios for the interview as follows:
If the defendant tells the truth about the crime, the probation officer
will add up the points differently. If the defendant denies the allegations, he or she may get a stiffer sentence for obstruction. If the defendant refuses to talk at all, he or she could preclude credit for accepting
responsibility for the crime.
Marcia Chambers, Probation Officers Sit in Judgment, NAT'L L.J., April 16, 1990, at 13.
215 For example, the 1990 Federal Courts Study Committee Report evidenced a
"growing concern among judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers" that the new investigative role was one for which probation officers were not "particularly well trained
213

...by

or well suited."

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL

138 (Apr. 1990).
See generally Paul W. Brown, Guns and Probation Officers: The Unspoken Reality, 54
FED. PROBATION 21 (1990) (postulating that as increasingly dangerous offenders are
placed on supervision due to prison crowding, more probation and parole officers
will become armed); Richard D. Sluder et al., Probation Officers' Role: Perceptions and
Attitudes Towards Firearms, 55 FED. PROBATION 3 (1991) (revealing divergent perceptions amongst probation officers as to whether they are a class of law enforcement
officer).
217 Harold B. Wooten & Mary K. Shilton, Reconstructing Probation, 7 CRIM. JUSTICE
12, 15 (Winter 1993) (article by probation officers characterizing their role and analyzing the supervisory aspects of their work within the federal system).
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE

216

218 TODD R.

CLEAR, OFFENDER ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION-THE PRESENTENCE IN-

VESTIGATION REPORT 21-22 (1989); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES:
LAW WITHOUT ORDER 34-35 (1973) (discussing errors in presentence investigations

resulting from the intrinsic bias of the data collection process).
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Determining that probation officers are not law enforcement
personnel, however, and concluding that their reports would be
admissible to prove the "matters observed" by them, does not end
the inquiry. The matters observed in the course of preparing the
report are not instances of conduct-facts perceived first hand by
the probation officer. Instead, they will consist of reading others'
written reports or interviews of witnesses who relate facts. The
"matters observed" thus constitute hearsay themselves and, under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, would require a separate hearsay
exception to warrant their admission into evidence. 9 In short,
hearing a statement of fact does not make the fact known to the
listener in the sense of imparting personal knowledge of it. 22 ° It
follows that a PSR could not be considered admissible at trial to
prove the truth of hearsay statements that it contained. Acknowledging that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at sentencing, a stark irony remains: A PSR will very often rely upon other
law enforcement reports to prove matters observed by police and
agents. In that case, reports that are inadmissible at trial are frequently found sufficiently reliable to warrant their use at
sentencing.
b.

Reports of "FactualFindings" Under Evidence Rule 803(8)(C)

Under Rule 803(8) (C),221 hearsay is admissible, in a civil case
and against the government in a criminal trial, if it represents a
finding that is the product of a legally-authorized investigation.
The rationale for this exception is similar to that of public records
generally: The official has a legal duty to certify facts and observations, and also to investigate and render an opinion based upon
those facts. 222 Evidence Rule 803(8) (C) thus recognizes that certain government employees are designated as fact-finders, and concludes that receipt of their conclusions should not be limited to
219 The evidence rules state, with respect to hearsay: "Hearsay included within
hearsay is not included under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rules provided in these rules." FED.
R. EvID. 805.
220 Meuller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 180, § 6.20 (1995) ("Personal knowledge of [a
witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 602] means firsthand knowledge that has
come to the witness through her own senses and includes two components-perception and memory."). See also EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
§ 10 (3d ed. 1984) ("[Personal knowledge rule requires] that a witness who testifies to
a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to observe,
and must have actually observed the fact.").
221 For the text of Evidence Rule 803(8) (C), see supra note 177 and accompanying
text.
222 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 183, at
803(8) [02] (1995).
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those facts of which they have personal knowledge.2 2 3
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,124 the Court confirmed the apparent breadth of the so-called "evaluative findings" exception.
Beech Aircraft addressed an investigative report by a U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander that was lawfully ordered by the Judge Advocate General (JAG). The JAG Report was the product of a six-week
investigation and presented both "findings" and "opinions." One
of the opinions addressed the "most likely" and "probable" cause of
the accident. The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge's exclusion of the opinions, holding that the Rule did not require exclusion of reports simply because they state a conclusion or
opinion. 2 5 All that is required is that the conclusions be based on
a factual investigation and be found trustworthy under the Rule.
As a result, the primary restriction on Evidence Rule
803(8) (C) lies in a clause precluding use of the exception if the
investigator's "sources of information or other circumstances indicate" a "lack of trustworthiness" in the findings. Under this provision, the credentials of the investigator and his methodology in
conducting the inquiry are addressed on a case-by-case basis. The
notes to the Rule suggested proper factors to assess in scrutinizing
the reliability of the conclusions.2 2 6 However, courts have determined that this "trustworthiness" clause does not allow courts to
second-guess the credibility of the investigator's sources. Rather,
the admissibility issue must focus on the methodology and credibility of the public official as author of the report.2 2 7 Nevertheless, if
223 See generally United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir.
1978) (findings contained in investigative reports held admissible under Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(8) (C) even though the product of "quasi-judicial hearing").
224 488 U.S. 153 (1988).

225 Id.

226 The Advisory Committee's Note on this provision provides:
Factors which may be of assistance in passing on the admissibility of
evaluative reports include: (1) the timeliness of the investigation... (2)
the special skill or experience of the official . . . (3) whether a hearing
was held and the level at which conducted ... and (4) possible motivational problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
R. EVD. 803(8) (C) (committee notes).
In Palmer, a pre-Rules case involving a railroad accident, the Court questioned
whether a firm's investigative report was a matter of routine so as to be admissible
under a statutory hearsay exception for business records. The Court suggested that
the report's utility in litigation posed a motivational problem to be assessed at the
admissibility stage. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113 (1943).
227 See Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300, 1305-07 (5th Cir. 1991) (determining that "trustworthiness" analysis may include examining bias of the author and
the nature of the report's conclusions).
FED.
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a report relies extensively on hearsay, it is excludable. 2 28
No doubt the sense of public duty that the probation officer
brings to the task of preparing the PSR propels him to attempt
accurate reporting. The officer's review of other official records
can likely be assured to be accurate, for example in determining
the defendant's prior criminal history from other official sources.
However, with respect to other facts not documented in court
files-such as uncharged criminal conduct-the officer must evaluate the credibility of his sources before reaching conclusions. In
this context, the PSR is much different than the type of report envisioned by Rule 803(8) (C) because the "witnesses" being investigated are themselves furnishing hearsay reports.
3.

Conclusion

The PSR is a unique type of public report, long relied upon by
federal judges. While it may not neatly fit within the typical model
of a "public record" treated by the evidence rules, it has features
that make it a special sort of public record, one that is the basis for
a criminal sentence and that must, in all cases, be above attack on
grounds of inaccuracy.
After comparing it to other public records, its multiple dimensions become apparent. The relationship between the probation
officer and the court has abandoned the former emphasis on tailoring a sentence to fit each defendant as a person with unique
qualities as an individual assigning the scheduled variables of the
Guidelines. As discussed in Part V(A) (3), the pleading function of
the PSR eliminates factual disputes by a waiver analysis. Matters
not specifically disputed by the defendant are deemed conceded or
true. It may seem incongruous not to question the facts recited in
the PSR in the absence of a challenge, but to scrutinize them in the
event of a challenge to its accuracy. Yet courts routinely rely upon
the probation officer's reported version of the facts in the PSR
without need for the officer to assume the witness stand. In essence, after isolating the factual issues when the "pleadings" are
closed, the PSR becomes evidentiary and proves one version of the
facts.

228 See, e.g., United States v. Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding reliance
on reports of convictions unfounded without demonstration of personal knowledge);
Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 726 n.15 (9th Cir. 1986) (resulting from a
failure to speak with participants with personal knowledge).
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The PSR as Akin to a MagistrateJudge's Report and
Recommendation

This section will compare the PSR to a Report and Recommendation (R&R) submitted by a United States Magistrate Judge
under the Magistrate's Act.22 9 Comparison of the fact-finding and
legal decision-making duties that generate both documents confirms their similarity. In many respects, the Guidelines have elevated the probation officer to a judicial officer whose judgment
carries significant weight at sentencing.
1.

The Magistrate Judge's Role in the Federal System

The Magistrate's Act authorizes district courts to appoint fulltime or part-time magistrate judges to assist them in adjudicating
all or part of cases in three primary ways. 230 First, 28 U.S.C. § 636
allows a judge to designate a magistrate judge to hear and decide
any pretrial motion not seeking injunctive relief, dismissal orjudgment on the merits of the complaint or indictment, or certification
of a class action. 3 1 Second, any of the dispositive motions excluded from the first class of matters may be referred to the magistrate judge (as may a prisoner petition or a criminal's postconviction application) for hearing and a report and recommendation to the district judge for proposed action. 2 Third, a district
court may authorize a magistrate judge to preside over trial of a
civil or misdemeanor criminal case with or without a jury.23 3 A
matter referred to the magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing
on claims deputizes him to develop a trial-type record. After the
hearing, the magistrate judge prepares a written R&R of proposed
findings and decision on the claim. The R&R is furnished to the
parties and objections, if any, must be lodged within ten days. A
229 FEDERAL MAGISTRATES AcT, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631-36).
230 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1992). Aside from the specific tasks delineated in the text,
§ 636(b) (3) empowers the magistrate judge to perform "such additional duties as are
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id.
Among the tasks that fall within this reserve of authority are the review and recommended decision on Social Security disability benefits appeals. See Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1961). The authority, however, does not extend to selection of a jury in a felony trial. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 870 (1989).
But see Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 940 (1991) (holding that parties may
consent to magistrate judge's selection of jury).
231 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A) (1988); FED. R. Cirv. P. 72(a).
232 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B) (1988); FED. R. CIv. P. 72(b).
233 The magistrate judge's authority to conduct civil trials is guided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. The criminal provisions are set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(b) (3) (A).
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failure to object in a timely fashion operates as a waiver. 2 3 4 Upon
objections, the district court is required to make a de novo determination of the disputed portions of the report. The district court
has discretion to "accept, reject, or modify" the findings or the
recommendation. 3 5
Where the magistrate judge has taken testimony in a matter,
review of his findings by the districtjudge is de novo as to contested
facts. Although the judge may receive further evidence, he is not
obliged to hear the disputed testimony.23 6 In United States v. Raddatz, 23 7 the Court held that due process does not require such rehearing, even in cases concerning the voluntariness of a criminal
defendant's statements. In doing so, it emphasized that district
judges conduct their own hearing as a matter of discretion. 2 ' The
standard of proof remains the same before both the magistrate
judge and the district judge. For example, facts bearing on a suppression motion (as involved in Raddatz) must be supported by a
simple preponderance of the evidence.23 9
It is widely-known that the magistrate judge's R&R is accepted
240
by the district court in the vast majority of circumstances,
although this phenomenon does not prove that trial judges abdicate their responsibility of independent review, reality suggests that
routinely delegating certain classes of cases to magistrate judges
(for example, habeas corpus and Social Security disability) gives
those judges the opportunity to develop an expertise that many
federal district judges may neither have nor want.
234 See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982) (magistrate's R&R
should advise parties of waiver consequences).
235 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980).
237

Id.

Id. at 680-82 & n.7. The Raddatz Court stated:
The issue is not before us, but we assume it is unlikely that a district
judge would rect a magistrate's proposed findings on credibility when
those findings are dispositive and substitute the judge's own appraisal;
to do so without seeing and hearing the witnesses or witnesses whose
credibility is in question could well give rise to serious questions which
we do not reach.
Id. at 681 n.7 (emphasis in original).
239 Id. at 678 n. 5 (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) for support that the
preponderance standard satisfies due process).
240 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES
100 (1985) (detailing one study revealing acceptance of R&R over objections in 79%
of sampled cases); Christopher E.Smith, United States Magistrates and the Processing of
PrisonerLitigation, 52 FED. PROBATION 4, 13, 15 (December 1988) (noting risk that
volume and repetitive nature of prisoners' litigation handled by magistrates carries
danger that judges might "rubber stamp" R&R's rather than apply careful review).
238
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Analogizing the PSR to the Magistrate Judge's R&R

To apply the Guidelines, the PSR contains separate sections
detailing the defendant's prior criminal history and the probation
officer's estimation of how the offense is classified under the
Guidelines. Prior to the Guidelines, the "offense" section was distilled from both the prosecution and defense versions of the offense with the goal of depicting an objective view of the true
facts.2 4 1 Today, however, the probation officer's work product is
very similar to the magistrate judge's R&R. The officer is no longer
merely a "conduit" for the prosecution and defense versions of the
offense; 24 2 the officer serves also as a preliminary fact-finder and
arbiter of which Guidelines to apply. 24 3 The PSR must (1) contain
a factual assessment of what criminal conduct occurred; and (2)
apply the law to the facts by making an analysis of offense level and
the offender history on the Guidelines grid. 4 4 In sum, the PSR
details and evaluates the specific offense conduct.
The probation officers' newly-assigned 'judicial" role is well
recognized. 24 5 The Administrative Office of the United States
Court's Probation Division recognizes that its officer's role is one
of investigating and evaluating facts and is radically different from
earlier practice.2 4 6 Probation officers themselves also acknowledge
that the set of skills-particularly the technical mastery required in
applying the Guidelines-emphasized in the preparation of the
Susan Grunin, The Investigative Role of the United States Probation Officers Under
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 FED. PROBATION 43, 44 (Dec. 1987) (discussing practice prior
to promulgation of Guidelines).
242 Charlie E. Varnon, The Role of the Probation Officer in the Guideline System, 4 FED.
SENT. REP. 63 (1991).
243 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) (4) (B).
244 Denzlinger & Miller, supra note 139, at 50.
245 Probation officers have been held to.be "quasi-judicial" officers inasmuch as
they are absolutely immune from suit in some aspects of their work. For example,
they are absolutely immune for their recommendations on the appropriate sentence.
The immunity has been extended to cover claims of misconduct in fabricating information used in terminating a defendant's supervised release. Lawrence v. Conlon, 92
C 2992, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4463, *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31 1995).
Additionally, the immunity extends to misconduct in investigating and preparing
the PSR. See, e.g., Tripati v. I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (involving allegedly false statements in PSR), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1028 (1988); Spaulding v. Nielsen,
599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979) (concerning a complaint that officer failed to conduct thorough and accurate investigation); Kauffman v. United States, 840 F. Supp.
641 (E.D. Wis. 1993). Cf Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970) (extending
the immunity to cover similar allegations against state probation officer in claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908 (1971).
241

246 PROBATION DIvIsION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, PRESENTENCE IN-

ACT OF 1984, at 2 (September
1987 with revisions through April 1988) (hereinafter Publication 107).
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PSR require background in more than the social sciences.2 4 7 The
Guidelines' scheme of relying almost exclusively on the classification of facts into discrete categories places a premium on logical
24 8
reasoning to perform the requisite "intellectual gymnastics."
Like magistrate judges, probation officers customarily discuss
cases with judges prior to decision.2 4 9 It has long been customary
for district judges to meet in camera with probation officers prior to
a probation hearing or sentencing. Some courts cite the historical
lack of any restriction on a sentencing judge's sources of information about the defendant. 25 ° Others find that the practice is justified because, like magistrate judges, the probation officer is legally
considered to be an arm of the court. 251 Characterizing such discussion as ex parte suggests an adversarial relationship between the
officer and the defendant. Nevertheless, it appears that no federal
court has disapproved of the practice.2 5 2
The striking feature common to both the R&R and the PSR is
that both impose the burden upon the objector to articulate
claimed errors. As a tentative finding reached after an evidentiary
review-either in or out of court-both documents carry a presumptive authority. Both regimes assign the party facing an adverse report with the duty to object regardless of whether that party
would have any burden of proof at trial. Similarly, the judge's resolution of objections to either report may be by way of an expressly
247 Harry J. Jaffe, The Pre-Sentence Report, Probation Officer Accountability, and Recruitment Practices, 53 FED. PROBATION 12 (1989) ("[S]election of new probation officers
solely from candidates holding social science degrees and groomed by a previous tour
of duty with a state or local probation department may, with the complexities of
guideline sentencing, impede rather than promote effective judicial decision
making.").
248 Publication 107, supra note 246, at 13.
249 United States v. Houston, 745 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1008 (1985).
250 United States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
953 (1976); see also United States v. Story, .716 F.2d 1088, 1089-90 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that probation officer's meeting with the judge prior to sentencing and discussing two defendants' divergent accounts of offense was proper). There is one clear
limitation on the practice of presentence conferences without the defendant-the
court may not involve the prosecutor at such a private meeting with the probation
officer. See generally, United States v. Hone, 456 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1972).
251 United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that presentence
conference between judge and probation officer is not "critical stage" of the proceeding to which right to presence of defense counsel attaches) (citing United States v.
Gonzales, 765 F.2d 1393, 1398 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986)).
252 United States v. Spudic, 795 F.2d 1334, 1342-44 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding improper a trial court's private meeting with several probation officers, only one of
whom had been involved in the writing of the PSR).
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wholesale adoption.255
A similar danger-that some federal judges may tend to defer
to the probation officer's view of the facts and assessment of the
Guidelines' application- is clearly present. 2 -4 As with the magistrate judge's R&R, the PSR is not entitled to any legal deference.255
Nonetheless, probation officers are generally viewed as the experts
in the application of the Guidelines. 256 The probation officers, as
required by the Sentencing Reform Act, have been intensively
trained in this area. 257 In fact, a practitioners' treatise construes
the Guideline which mandates preparation of the report as a
strong suggestion to counsel to assist in shaping the resulting PSR.
Federal sentencing practice guides urge defendants to influence
the report by cooperating in furnishing information to the officer,
because the PSR will have a "presumption of validity" before the
sentencing judge.258
253 In connection with the R&R, see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676
(1980). With respect to the PSRs, see United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 245 (4th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Upshaw, 918 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1335 (1991).
254 Charley Roberts, Bend Sentencing Guidelines Where Appropriate, Judges Urge, CHi.
DAILY L. BuiL., February 20, 1992, at 3. Roberts quoted United States District Court
Judge William W. Schwarzer, senior judge of the northern district of California, as
saying that sentencingjudge's independent exercise of discretion as to possible departure from the Guidelines "requires a lot of time and energy, plus skill and expertise
[but that] judges are pressed for time and there is a tendency to leave it to probation
officers." Id.
255 See United States v. Schuler, 34 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that no
deference is due a probation officer's findings or Guidelines analysis because district
court is not bound by recommendation and has responsibility for resolving disputed
sentencing factors under Rule 32(a)(1) and U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3).
256 Denzlinger & Miller, supra note 139, at 50 (noting massive training effort to
impart fact-finding and legal analysis skills in the wake of the Guidelines, which resulted in the probation officer remaining in the "sometimes unpopular role of guidelines 'expert,' if such a role is possible").
See also United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 1992), wherein a
prosecutor urged the trial court to accept the probation officer's application of
Guidelines because the officer was "the expert in the area of [PSRs] and the area of
the [G]uidelines." Id. The court's adoption of the officer's view was reversed on appeal as incorrect. See id.
257 The U.S. Sentencing Commission trains probation officers pursuant to its statutory charge to "devise and conduct period training programs of instruction in sentencing techniques for judicial and probation personnel and other persons
connected with the sentencing process." See generally 28 U.S.C. § 995(a) (18) (1988).
258 Hutchison et al., supra note 45, § 6AI.1, at 640-41 cmt. 2. Hutchison states that
[clooperation in the preparation of the [PSR] may result in some benefits .... The probation officer will often try to resolve disputed facts by
consulting with both the prosecution and defense. The defendant can
certainly wait to challenge the presentence report at the time of sentencing, but by then the report has a presumption of validity that may
be difficult to overcome.
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While not discussed in the cases as an evidentiary presumption, it does appear that PSRs are routinely accepted by the district
courts both in their factual findings259 and application of the
Guidelines to the facts. 26 ° Of course, the possible prejudging of

issues is an age-old occupational hazard that is not demonstrated to
be a problem with federaljudges. 2 1 Accepting that federal judges
undertake an independent review of the contested Guidelines issues, the PSR-as the product
of the court's staff-is still likely to
26 2
carry significant weight.

In any event, judges tend to accept the report of the probation
officer. This may stem from the officer's position as an extension
of the court. Acceptance is undoubtedly influenced by the recurring one-on-one meetings with the employee who is statutorily
charged with conducting an impartial review of the matter. It may
also be, however, that judges are inclined to find facts pointing the
most serious offense level and offender characteristics.263 Appellate review of findings based upon a PSR is substantially similar to
Id.

259 See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Estrada, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 21694 (7th Cir.
Apr. 11, 1995) (noting that the PSR recommends no allowance of reduction of offense level for acceptance of responsibility on grounds that defendant lied to the
probation officer and accepting that conclusion without an evidentiary hearing emphasizing that defendant's conduct was tantamount to lying to the court); United
States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1994).
260 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 934 n.6 (1994) (stating that "'[w]e [federal judges]
find ourselves giving [PSR's] cursory attention because we are usually just checking
the probation officer's addition. Whereas sentencing once called for hours spent reflecting on the offense and the person, we judges are becoming rubber-stamp bureaucrats."') (quotingJudge Jack B. Weinstein, A TrialJudge'sSecond Impression of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.CAL. L. Rxv. 357, 364 (1992)).
261 United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 845-47 (7th Cir. 1976) is quite clearly an
aberration. In Sciuto, the record revealed that, prior to a hearing on probation revocation, the judge had expressed his conviction in the credibility of the probation officer's account of facts and also his conclusion that the defendant had been dishonest
and deceitful with the probation officer. 531 F.2d at 845-47. The judge's conclusion
was based upon an ex parte conversation with the officer.
262 Bunzel, supra note 1, at 934. See also United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216,
1223 (8th Cir.) (stating that "district courts have come increasingly to rely on the
recommendations of the probation officers .... Consequently, is a sad but true fact
of life under the Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are
now made, not by the court, but by probation officers."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943
(1990). But see William W. Wilkins, Jr., Observations on Judge Heaney's Study, 4 FED.
SENT. REP. 145 (1990) (U.S. Sentencing Commission Chairman takes issue with any
suggestion that federal judges are "rubber-stamping" PSR recommendations).
263 See also Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 931, 1033 (1983) (referring
to so-called "slow plea of guilty" as a characterization of nonjury trials in Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, and other cities, convened at the insistence of defendants but invariably
resulting in a finding of guilt).
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that for the recommended findings in a magistrate judge's R&R.2 64
The similarities between the PSR and the R&R suggest that the
Guidelines have elevated probation officers to a position akin to
that of a judicial officer. Certainly, the probation officer is unique
among federal employees in possessing judicial-style duties without
any of the protocol usually attending the selection of judges or
magistrate judges. They have been called "bureaucratic" and have
been compared to Social Security Administration employees who
make determinations of disability.2 65 The increased importance of
the PSR has mandated that more time be invested in its preparation, thus consuming probation officers' hours in a much greater
proportion than before the Guidelines. The palpable effects of the
increased workload include both a strain on the officers' relationships with defendants prior to their sentencing and a decrease in
the amount of their time available to moniter current
probationers. 6 6
VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal courts routinely consider a PSR prior to passing judgment on the appropriate sentence for a criminal defendant. The
PSR is prepared by federal probation officers who are employed by
the courts to investigate the facts of the offense and the defendant's background before making a sentencing recommendation.
Courts consider the PSR at sentencing and often hear testimony
from the probation officer to resolve disputed facts contained in
the report.
Under the Guidelines, however, the PSR is more than simply
an advisory report. It is a charging document that goes beyond the
indictment in identifying the specific conduct that the probation
officer believes should determine the defendant's punishment
264 The standard of review employed by courts of appeals is similar to that applied
in other civil and criminal cases. The legal interpretation and application of the

Guidelines is deemed a question of law for de novo review. See United States v.
Buenrostro, 24 F.3d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). Facts that are predicate

findings for application of a Guideline, however, cannot be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous and the judge's selection of a sentence within an applicable Guideline
range is left to its discretion.

See generally Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193

(1992).
265 Jaffe, supranote 247, at 12 ("The Social Security bureaucrat interviews the claimant, gathers the necessary documentation and, similar to the probation officer, after
consulting a guidelines manual, fixes a determination of disability-full, partial,
none. How similar to the probation officer's tasks of fixing punishment-jail, probation, fine.").
266 See generally Cook, Jr., supra note 204, at 112 (recounting probation officers'
expressions of concern regarding the time constraints affecting department morale).
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under the Guidelines. The PSR also details the probation officer's
view of the true facts of the offense, a version that in many cases is
drawn from police and law enforcement reports, rather than from
personal interviews of witnesses. That version of facts will be taken
as established unless the defendant specifically disputes it. Finally,
the PSR serves as a suggested analysis of the Guidelines' application as the officer applies the laws to the facts in the first instance.
The PSR thus functions on three different levels under the
Guidelines: (1) as a pleading; (2) as an exhibit; and (3) as a quasijudicial report and recommendation. None of these analogies
alone can fully describe the PSR. Instead, the unique combination
of functions explains to some extent the varying evidentiary treatment accorded the PSR by sentencing judges. These divergent
roles of the PSR are at the heart of Guideline sentencing and, to a
great extent, have eclipsed the role of the sentencing judge. The
abbreviated (often summary) trial of facts at federal sentencing underscores the unique nature and effect of the PSR, which has been
transformed from a disinterested report to an adversarial one of
multiple dimensions. Under the Guidelines, it serves the court in
narrowing and proving the issues unlike any other traditional court
filing from the parties or pretrial order. As a procedural innovation, it may prove to be a prototype for adaption to civil cases in
the form of pretrial order prepared not by the parties, but by magistrate judges, masters, or civil servants in similar roles.
The Sentencing Guidelines have been roundly criticized for
effectively removing judicial discretion from the sentencing process and for reassigning much of that discretion to the probation
officer. It remains to be seen whether the rare combination of
roles detracts from the overall quality of justice at the sentencing
stage. Clearly, though, the PSR under the Guidelines has affected
the way in which defendants and their counsel view the probation
officer and the PSR. The PSR, more than ever before, contains
charges against which the defendant must defend. The PSR contains evidence and determinations of fact and law, usually adverse
to the defendant's interests. The defendant's impression that the
probation officer is no longer a friend, advocate, or even neutral,
will no doubt diminish his faith in the legitimacy of the Guidelines
sentence.

